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HARD VERSUS SOFT LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
Gregory C. Shaffer* 
Mark A. Pollack** 
Abstract: The use and choice of hard and soft law in international gov-
ernance has been the subject of ever-increasing scholarly interest. This 
law and social science literature has primarily assessed the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of hard- and soft-law instruments as alternatives 
for international governance, as well as how these instruments can be 
combined as mutually reinforcing complements to lead to greater interna-
tional cooperation over time. By contrast, we argue that under certain 
conditions, hard and soft law can and do operate as antagonists. In short, 
states and non-state actors increasingly use soft law not to “progressively 
develop” existing hard law, but to undermine it. In our previous scholar-
ship we have demonstrated this antagonistic interaction of hard and soft 
law in the economic realm, where the international trade system often in-
teracts in antagonistic ways with related areas of international environ-
mental and cultural law. In this Article, we look beyond economic law, ex-
amining the interaction of hard and soft legal instruments with respect to 
two fundamental questions of international security law: (1) the legality of 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and (2) the legality of the use of 
force in humanitarian intervention under the “responsibility to protect” 
doctrine. In both cases, states and non-state actors have employed hard 
and soft law, not as complements in a progressive process of international 
legal development, but as antagonists, with soft-law pronouncements be-
ing used to undermine long-standing hard-law norms. In both cases, the 
result has been to obscure, rather than to clarify and elaborate, the most 
fundamental norms of the international legal system. 
Introduction 
 The use and choice of hard and soft law in international govern-
ance has been the subject of ever-increasing scholarly interest. This law 
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and social science literature primarily assesses the relative functional 
attributes and deficiencies of hard- and soft-law instruments as alterna-
tives for international governance, as well as how these instruments can 
be combined as mutually reinforcing complements to lead to greater in-
ternational cooperation over time.1 By contrast, we have argued else-
where that hard and soft law can operate, under certain conditions, not 
only as alternatives and complements, but also as antagonists, in two 
senses.2 First, from a legal perspective, hard and soft legal norms can be 
antagonistic in a conflict-of-laws sense; that is, a proliferation of legal 
norms can and often do lead to inconsistencies and conflicts among 
norms in the international legal order.3 Second, from a political per-
spective, states and non-state actors can strategically create and deploy 
hard and soft legal instruments to attempt to undermine, change, and 
reorient existing international law.4 The primary reason that hard and 
soft law sometimes interact as antagonists and not complements is be-
cause of the conflicting distributive implications of law and legal 
change for states, and in particular (although not only) among power-
ful states. 
 In these situations of conflict, the interaction of hard and soft law 
can affect the purported advantages and nature of international hard 
and soft law as conventionally depicted. Specifically, the antagonistic 
interaction of hard and soft law can lead to the softening of hard law— 
that is, it can become less clear and precise in its meaning, thus reduc-
ing legal certainty and predictability. Stated differently, new soft law not 
only elaborates and fills out existing hard law in a complementary 
manner as typically depicted,5 but can be used strategically to under-
mine it. 
 In parallel, such conflict can lead to strategic hard bargaining with-
in soft-law regimes, thus upsetting their purported advantages of con-
sensus building through information sharing, deliberation, and persua-
sion. The existing literature has stressed how soft-law regimes offer ad-
vantages over hard-law regimes in that they afford greater flexibility, 
                                                                                                                      
1 See, e.g., Nicholas Bane, Hard and Soft Law in International Institutions: Complements, Not 
Alternatives, in Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, En-
vironment and Social Governance 347, 350–51 ( John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock 
eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hard Choices]; C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Develop-
ment and Change in International Law, 38 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 850, 856–59 (1989). 
2 Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and 
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 706, 708 (2010). 
3 Id. at 746. 
4 Id. 
5 See infra notes 97–108 and accompanying text. 
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experimentation, and deliberative exchange regarding alternative pro-
posals to address policy challenges.6 Yet the processes within these re-
gimes may become sclerotic where advocates of new soft law aim to un-
dermine and reorient existing hard law. It is not that soft law simply 
becomes hardened in the sense of becoming legally binding, although 
that is often the aim of its proponents. Rather, soft-law processes may 
become beset by hard, strategic bargaining, thus undermining delib-
eration, which in turn diminishes the prospects for cooperative out-
comes through persuasion and learning—the attributes of soft law 
processes. 
 In our previous work, we sought to understand the antagonistic 
interaction of hard and soft law in the area of international economic 
law, in particular where international trade law overlaps with that of 
other substantive regimes.7 Many of these areas involve situations in 
which a hard-law international trading system overlaps and interacts in 
complex ways with other softer regimes governing issues such as envi-
ronmental protection, food safety, public health, and cultural heritage. 
Specifically, we showed how states have employed hard and soft law sys-
tematically as antagonists in issue areas such as the regulation of ge-
netically modified foods and crops, the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights, and the protection of cultural diversity. 
 One potential objection to our previous work is that we draw our 
evidence for the antagonistic interaction of hard and soft law almost 
entirely from the realm of “low” politics (or “trade-and” issues), which 
international relations scholars often regard as being most favorable for 
international law and cooperation.8 In this Article, we assess whether 
our framework and the hypotheses derived from it are applicable to 
other situations in which actors seek to use international law strategi-
cally to advance their interests. 
 This Article thus formulates and tests four hypotheses about the 
choice and interaction of hard and soft law in the very different, “high 
politics” realm of international security. Specifically, we examine the 
interaction of hard and soft legal instruments with respect to two major 
questions of international security law, that of: (1) the legality of the 
                                                                                                                      
6 See infra notes 79–96 and accompanying text. 
7 See generally Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2. 
8 See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case 
of Western Europe, 95 Daedalus 862, 874, 882, 900–01 (1966). For a good discussion of the 
high-low distinction in international relations theory, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 
Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy 243–44 nn.13–
16 (2002). 
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threat or use of nuclear weapons, and (2) the legality of the use of force 
in humanitarian intervention under the “responsibility to protect” doc-
trine. Although the specifics of these cases, the issues raised, and the 
key actors vary substantially from economic regulation (or “low poli-
tics”) cases, the core elements of our framework—the strategic use and 
resulting antagonistic interaction of hard and soft legal provisions—are 
present in the area of international security law as well. 
 Part I presents our core theoretical arguments regarding the use of 
hard and soft law as alternatives, complements, and antagonists.9 It be-
gins with a brief overview of the turn from customary international law 
to treaties and other written instruments in Section I.A, noting the gra-
dual codification and “progressive development” of international law as 
articulated in the United Nations (UN) Charter.10 One can usefully 
characterize the resulting instruments as “hard” or “soft” in terms of 
different dimensions. In Section I.B, we then examine critically the 
leading definitions of hard and soft law, recognizing the current rift in 
the scholarship on this question.11 Rather than focusing exclusively on 
the binding or nonbinding nature of an instrument, we instead adopt a 
nuanced view of an instrument’s hard or soft properties along the addi-
tional dimensions of precision and enforceability via a third-party deci-
sion maker. Section I.C next presents the existing literature regarding 
the relative advantages of hard and soft law as alternatives, and the ways 
in which hard- and soft-law instruments interact as complements in the 
progressive development of international law.12 It then explains our 
argument regarding the scope conditions under which hard and soft 
law interact as antagonists rather than as complements, and concludes 
in Section I.D by setting forth four hypotheses for assessment in the 
area of international security law.13 
 Part II turns to our first international security case, the decades-
long dispute over the legality of the use, or threat of use, of nuclear 
weapons.14 Nuclear powers including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union fostered a hard-law legal regime in the 
postwar period that placed some restrictions on the development, test-
ing, deployment, and proliferation of nuclear weapons, but did not 
question the legality of their possession, threat, or use by existing nu-
                                                                                                                      
9 See infra notes 25–193 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 25–58 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 59–74 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 75–154 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 155–193 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 194–325 and accompanying text. 
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clear weapons states.15 From the 1970s, however, a coalition of nonnu-
clear states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) challenged 
this body of hard law, seeking to undermine existing law through the 
use, if available, of hard-law conventions and, failing that, of soft-law 
instruments, including a long series of General Assembly (“GA”) reso-
lutions,16 as well as a General Assembly request for an advisory opinion 
from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nu-
clear weapons.17 In this case, states and non-state actors deployed soft-
law provisions not to elaborate or clarify existing hard law, but rather in 
a deliberate effort to undermine and change existing international law 
in fundamental ways. 
 Part III examines a second security case, namely the debate over 
humanitarian intervention and the “responsibility to protect” individu-
als from harm suffered at the hands of their own governments.18 Here 
again, an existing body of hard law, including, most notably, provisions 
of the UN Charter, provided a nearly absolute defense of national sov-
ereignty, placing legal limits on the right of the international commu-
nity to intervene in states’ internal affairs.19 Faced with a growing series 
of humanitarian crises in the 1990s, culminating with the bitterly dis-
puted 1999 North American Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention 
in Kosovo, a coalition of Western states, NGOs, and the UN Secretary 
General, began a decade-long campaign in various soft-law fora to de-
velop new principles and new criteria justifying humanitarian interven-
tion through a responsibility to protect doctrine.20 These fora included 
a series of international committees and a soft-law General Assembly 
resolution adopted as part of the 2005 UN summit meeting to com-
memorate the organization’s sixtieth anniversary. Although this case 
involved very different coalitions of contending states and non-state 
actors, all of these actors engaged in the strategic and antagonistic use 
of hard and soft law. 
 The results of both case studies strongly support our hypotheses 
about the antagonistic interaction of hard and soft law. Such interac-
tion emerges as a generic feature of international security lawmaking as 
well as international economic regulation. In a world characterized by 
multiple international fora, the traditional narrative of hard and soft 
                                                                                                                      
15 See infra notes 195–218 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 219–220 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 234–258 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 326–452 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 326–358 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 359–408 and accompanying text. 
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law as complements or alternatives does not tell the whole story. Rather, 
in both the economic and security spheres, actors deploy hard and soft 
international legal instruments in light of their perceived interests and 
the distributive consequences at stake. Whether the antagonistic inter-
action of hard and soft law is normatively desirable or undesirable de-
pends both on one’s substantive values with respect to the issues in dis-
pute, and on the value one assigns to uniformity or pluralism in the 
international legal order. Regardless, it is clear that the strategic use of 
hard and soft law has profound implications for the international legal 
order. 
I. Theoretical Framework 
 This Part begins by tracing the historical origins of hard and soft 
law and their role in the development of international law.21 It then 
proceeds to further define and clarify the terms hard law and soft law, 
addressing the current divide in the existing scholarship.22 Rather than 
adopting a binary definition of hard and soft law as binding or non-
binding, we employ a more nuanced social-science approach, consider-
ing instead the manners in which instruments can be harder or softer 
along a number of different dimensions. Section I.C elaborates the 
conventional depictions of hard and soft law’s respective advantages 
and complementary interaction, then sets forth the scope conditions 
under which actors deploy hard and soft law as alternatives, as com-
plements, or as antagonists.23 Finally, Section I.D summarizes our hy-
potheses about how such interactions will shape transnational interac-
tions in the context of the international security case studies that follow 
in Parts II and III.24 
A. Hard Law, Soft Law, and the Progressive Development of  
International Law 
 Before delving into our modern analysis, it is useful to consider 
the historical origins of international law and how they shape our un-
derstanding of its contemporary application through hard- and soft-law 
instruments. The purpose of international law, conventionally viewed, 
is to reduce interstate conflict and facilitate interstate cooperation to 
address transnational and global problems, including by enhancing the 
                                                                                                                      
21 See infra notes 25–58 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 59–74 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 75–154 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 155–193 and accompanying text. 
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credibility of commitments and resolving disputes through law and le-
gal institutions.25 For most of its history, international law was not codi-
fied.26 It rather grew out of natural law and Roman law.27 As the under-
standing of international law became more positivist, scholars viewed 
international law in terms of custom, consisting of state practice arising 
out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).28 Customary interna-
tional law remains an important source of international law as reflected 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and the judgments of international tribunals, which continue today.29 
 The existence and scope of customary international law address-
ing particular issues, however, is often contested. Moreover, customary 
international law is backward looking, whereas communities need to 
                                                                                                                      
25 Alternatives to this functionalist view focus on law as an instantiation and institu-
tionalization of power, such as that of states (international relations realism) or of transna-
tional capital (Marxism). For an overview of different perspectives in relation to global 
governance, see generally Power in Global Governance (Michael Barnett & Raymond 
Duvall eds., 2005). 
26 L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. 
313, 315 (1908) (“The rules of the present international law are to a great extent not writ-
ten rules, but based on custom.”); id. at 349 (recognizing, however, that “[t]he future of 
international law belongs to conventional and not to customary law. But custom will always 
remain at the background of international law . . . .”). 
27 See, e.g., Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the Unit-
ed States (pt. 1), 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 29 (1952) (noting that public international law “had 
been enriched by borrowings and adaptations from the Roman Law”); Joseph L. Kunz, 
Editorial Comment, Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law, 55 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 951, 951 (1961); Arthur Nussbaum, The Significance of Roman Law in the History of 
International Law, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 678, 681 (1952); Jesse S. Reeves, The Influence of the 
Law of Nature upon International Law in the United States, 3 Am. J. Int’l L. 547, 547–48 (1909) 
(describing the influence of natural rights theory on international law). See generally The 
Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations (Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Strau-
mann eds., 2010). 
28 William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 
Harv. L. Rev. F. 19, 26 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/dodge.pdf 
(“Under the positivist theory that has prevailed since the nineteenth century, customary 
international law must be based upon ‘a general and consistent practice of states followed 
by them from a sense of legal obligation.’”) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law § 102(2) (1987)); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the 
Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 
639, 660 (2000) (“The positivist account requires the discovery of a widespread state prac-
tice that nations follow from opinio juris.”). 
29 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060 (1945); see, e.g., Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 78 ( July 9) (referencing customary interna-
tional law); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 71 
(Feb. 20) (noting the possibility that customary international law may develop from un-
written norms). 
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develop law to adapt to new circumstances.30 As interstate and transna-
tional exchange deepened in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a 
movement toward the codification and development of international 
law arose to enhance legal clarity and legal certainty.31 The concept 
took hold in legal circles in the 1850s and 1860s as prominent academ-
ics, such as David Dudley Field in the United States, proposed the 
compilation of a code for presentation to “the governments, in the 
hope of its receiving, at some time, their sanction.”32 In 1873, leading 
private lawyers established two associations to promote the codification 
of international law: the International Law Association and the Institut 
de Droit International.33 
 Governments followed suit.34 At the intergovernmental Hague 
Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, states codified aspects of the in-
ternational law of war, although only the 1907 conference was attended 
by a significant number of non-Western states.35 Following World War I, 
states through the League of Nations continued the push toward codifi-
cation, with a focus on international law’s development. The League 
Assembly began to adopt resolutions in 1924 that advocated “‘progres-
                                                                                                                      
30 Arthur Watts, Codification and Progressive Development of International Law, in Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2006). 
31 Jeremy Bentham—credited with coining the term “codification” —offered to codify 
the laws of many countries, including the United States, in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. See Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” 
and Public Sphere(s), 5 Law & Ethics Hum. Rts. 1, 19 (2011). Bentham sketched the first 
proposal for a code of international law in the 1780s, though these writings were not pub-
lished until later. See Report of Sub-Committee upon the History and Status of Codification, 4 Am. 
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 208, 214–18 (1910) [hereinafter ASIL Proceedings] (reviewing Ben-
tham’s writings on international codification); see also Watts, supra note 30, ¶ 4. 
32 ASIL Proceedings, supra note 31, at 219; id. at 221 (labeling Alphonse de Domin-
Petrushevecz’s 1861 Précis d’un Code du Droit International, which included 236 articles and 
purported to comprise a comprehensive summary of international law, as the “first at-
tempted codification worthy of the subject”); id. at 220 (identifying Francis Lieber’s fa-
mous Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, compiled at Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln’s request in the throes of the U.S. Civil War as “the starting point of 
the modern movement in favor of the codification of the Law of Nations”); see also Leslie 
C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 36 & n.69 (3d ed. 2008) (identi-
fying the Lieber Code as the “first modern attempt to draw up a binding code for the con-
duct of an armed force in the field”); General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (1863) [hereinafter Lieber 
Code], reprinted in Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al., International Law: Norms, Actors, 
Process 497, 497 (3d ed. 2010)). 
33 Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law 163–64 
(2007). The ILA was initially named the Association for the Reform and Codification of 
the Law of Nations. Id. at 164. 
34 See Watts, supra note 30, ¶¶ 5–6. 
35 See Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 165. 
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sive codification’ in order to ‘define, improve and develop’ interna-
tional law.”36 “The spirit of codification,” the Assembly declared, “should 
not confine itself to the mere registration of existing rules, but should 
aim at adapting them as far as possible to contemporary conditions of 
life.”37 The League organized a “Conference for the Codification of In-
ternational Law” in 1930 in Geneva, Switzerland but the agreement 
reached fell short of any comprehensive codifications.38 
 After World War II, states incorporated the goals of the codifica-
tion and progressive development of international law into the UN 
Charter. Article 13(1)(a) charges the General Assembly with “ini-
tiat[ing] studies and mak[ing] recommendations for the purpose of . . . 
encouraging the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”39 Among the General Assembly’s early acts was the crea-
tion of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) in 1947, the first 
standing international public body charged with international law’s 
codification and progressive development.40 Article 15 of the Statute of 
the International Law Commission identifies the “progressive develop-
ment of international law” as “the preparation of draft conventions on 
subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in 
regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the 
practice of States.”41 Other agencies, commissions and organizations, 
                                                                                                                      
 
36 Id. at 165–66 (quoting League of Nations Assembly Resolutions adopted in Sept. 22, 
1924; Sept. 27, 1927; and Sept. 25, 1931). The League of Nations established a Committee 
of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law in 1924, which can be 
viewed as the predecessor of the International Law Commission. See id. at 166; Mark E. 
Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory 
and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources 69–70 (2d ed. 1997). 
37 Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 165–66 (citing Resolution Adopted by the Assembly 
of the League of Nations, League of Nations Doc. Spec. Supp. No. 53 ¶ 6(d) (1927)). 
38 See Villiger, supra note 36, at 71–72 (describing reasons for this failure). 
39 U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1a. 
40 Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 171–76. 
41 Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21, 1947). In contrast, the ILC’s Statute formally defines “codifica-
tion of international law” as “the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of 
international law in fields where there has already been extensive State practice, precedent 
and doctrine.” Id. The Statute defines the concepts of “codification” and “progressive de-
velopment” distinctly, but in practice they overlap, since the existing state of customary 
international law is not always clear. See id. In practice, “if codification by the ILC necessar-
ily entails progressive development, it seems that progressive development by the ILC gen-
erally entails some element of codification.” Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 175; see 
also R.Y. Jennings, The Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, 24 
Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 301, 309 (1947); H. Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of Interna-
tional Law, 49 Am. J. Int’l L. 16, 35 (1955) (noting that with respect to codification “drafts 
as finally put before governments and the General Assembly should express . . . the views 
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whether within or outside of the UN system, have served as the locus 
for codifying and developing international law in specialized fields.42 
 The aim of the ILC’s efforts tends to be the creation of treaties, 
but in many cases, ILC drafts are not ratified.43 In these cases, the ILC’s 
work toward “progressive development” of international law remains, 
essentially, a soft law document, although it may have persuasive force 
insofar as international courts may refer to it as evidence of emerging 
customary international law.44 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin point 
to this use of ILC instruments as an example of international law’s de-
velopment through the interaction of different processes.45 The work 
of the ILC, in other words, can be viewed in terms of the complemen-
tary interaction of soft and hard law, which we further examine below.46 
 There is a third conception of international legal instruments in 
addition to that of codification and progressive development: new law-
making.47 With the proliferation of international initiatives in recent 
decades resulting in a vast array of new legal instruments, scholars have 
developed the terminology of hard and soft law to capture this lawmak-
ing process.48 No longer do international law scholars focus solely on 
the interaction of customary international law and treaties in interna-
tional law’s progressive development. Rather, legal scholarship has in-
creasingly addressed the hard and soft law characteristics of new inter-
national instruments, the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
these characteristics in different contexts, and how these instruments 
can be used progressively as complements.49 
 Much of this literature focuses on the claim that the progressive 
development of international law works increasingly through the com-
plementary interaction of hard and soft legal instruments. This process 
plays out in two ways. First, soft law may develop over time and harden 
into hard law, just as customary international law has been codified and 
                                                                                                                      
of the codifying agency as to the solution which is accurate de lege lata and desirable de lege 
ferenda). 
42 Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 167. 
43 See Watts, supra note 30, ¶ 29. 
44 See Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 190. 
45 See id. (“[I]t is the interaction of the ILC, the diplomatic conferences, subsequent 
practice and judicial decisions” that has “shaped the modern law of treaties.”). 
46 See infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text. 
47 Watts, supra note 30, ¶ 22. 
48 See infra notes 77–94 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text. 
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progressively developed in treaty law.50 Second, hard law may be elabo-
rated, extended, and progressively developed through soft law.51 One 
might understand this process as a contemporary manifestation of the 
“progressive development” concept described above.52 That is, non-
binding soft-law instruments help pave the way into binding hard-law 
instruments, just as discrete state practices can aggregate and give rise 
over time to a consensus regarding general binding customary interna-
tional law. As one writer frames it, “progressive” is viewed “in the sense 
of an evolution from a ‘soft law’ to a ‘hard law’ instrument.”53 Similarly, 
another author writes: 
The pattern . . . is one in which so-called “soft law” crystallizes 
into hard law. This evolution proceeds as follows: operational 
activities occur against the backdrop of widely acknowledged 
but not well-specified norms; in carrying out those activities, 
international organizations do not seek to enforce the norms 
per se but typically act in a manner that conforms to them; 
these activities generate friction, triggering bouts of legal ar-
gumentation; the reaction of affected governments—and the 
discourse that surrounds the action and reaction—can cause 
the law to harden.54 
This view of soft law as crystallizing into hard law has its parallels in the 
view of state practice evolving into customary international law. But 
now the process takes place in a world in which written international 
law has proliferated and somewhat displaced the role of customary in-
ternational law.55 Similarly, moving from hard treaty law as a starting 
                                                                                                                      
 
50 See Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in Com-
mitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System 30–31 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
51 See id. 
52 See Jennings, supra note 41, at 309. 
53 Cynthia Day Wallace, The Legal Framework for Regulating the Global Enterprise Going into 
the New WTO Trade Round—A Backward and a Forward Glance, 16 Transnat’l L. 141, 142 
(2002). 
54 Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities of International Organiza-
tions, 40 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 87, 88 (2008). 
55 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal 
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1, 30 (2010) (stating that “multilat-
eral treatymaking has displaced some of the traditional functions of CIL”); Curtis A. Brad-
ley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 Yale L.J. 202, 208–09 (2010) 
(noting that “there has since been a proliferation of treaties, both in quantity and range of 
subject matter, especially after the establishment of the United Nations system” such that 
“most of the major issue areas that were historically covered by CIL are now covered, to 
one degree or another, by treaties”); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International 
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point, we shall see below that both scholars and advocates of specific 
causes, such as humanitarian intervention, have depicted soft law in-
struments as supplementing, elaborating, and progressively developing 
existing hard law. Soft law, in this sense, represents a modern variant of 
the “law to be made,” lex ferenda, which reflects the aspiration of law’s 
progressive development.56 
 This Article aims to deepen our understanding of the interaction 
of international legal instruments in a world of fragmented interna-
tional legal fora and regimes in which legal instruments have varied 
distributive consequences for different states. Our framework has its 
predecessor in legal realist analysis of the development of customary 
international law—that of the New Haven School of international law.57 
As Myres McDougal classically wrote in respect of customary interna-
tional law, it develops through 
a process of continuous interaction, of continuous demand 
and response, in which the decision-makers of particular na-
tion states unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse 
and conflicting character . . . and in which other decision-
makers . . . weigh and appraise these competing claims in 
terms of the interests of the world community and of the rival 
claimant, and ultimately accept or reject them.58 
                                                                                                                      
Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 449 passim (2000). Nonetheless, treaties and customary interna-
tional law can overlap and exist in parallel. See, e.g., Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 
234–38; José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 17, 72–74 (2009) 
(noting that, at least in the context of international investment law, “the move to invest-
ment treaties does not displace resort to CIL or general principles”). 
56 See Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 33, at 212. The term de lege ferenda (or lex ferenda) 
can be translated as “what the law should be,” “future law,” or “the law to be made,” in 
contrast to “what the law is” (de lege lata). See id.; Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 35. 
57 See W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86 
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 118, 120–24 (1992) (setting forth the defining features of the 
New Haven School). 
58 Myres S. McDougal, Editorial Comment, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International 
Law of the Sea, 49 Am. J. Int’l L. 356, 357 (1955); see also Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. 
Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision (pt. 1), 
19 J. Legal Educ. 253, 257–58 (1967); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Michael 
Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision (pt. 2), 19 J. Legal Educ. 
403, 430–31 (1967); W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Assessing Claims to Revise the 
Laws of War, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 82 (2003) (representing a more recent articulation of 
the perspective of “a ceaseless dialectic” in the production of international law); W. Mi-
chael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International 
Law, 10 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 9 (1984); W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process 
of Communication, 75 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 101, 105 (1981). 
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International law in this view is a process of making claims and re-
sponding to them. In our contemporary world of written instruments, 
the interaction of hard and soft law should be viewed in this light. 
 With this background, we now turn to clarify the definition of hard 
and soft law, and elaborate the conventional depictions of their respec-
tive advantages and complementary interaction. We then turn to ad-
dress the scope conditions under which states and other actors deploy 
hard and soft law as complements or antagonists, and the hypotheses 
derived from our theoretical framework. 
B. Defining Hard and Soft Law Along a Spectrum 
 In our previous scholarship, we have demonstrated the complexi-
ties inherent in defining hard and soft law.59 The definitions applied in 
the existing literature have tended to split across positivist–realist 
lines.60 Many positivist legal scholars, for instance, frame the distinction 
between hard and soft law using a simple, binary binding/non-binding 
divide.61 Some such scholars take this further still, finding the very con-
cept of soft law to be illogical because law by definition cannot be 
“more or less binding.”62 
 In the world of practice, however, actors are faced not with a bi-
nary choice, but with a range of legal options to structure their interac-
tions. It is well documented that actors’ use of international agreements 
has proliferated over the last decades, representing a legalization of 
international relations.63 These actors use different types of interna-
tional agreements with distinct characteristics to further their particular 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 712–17. 
60 See id. 
61 See Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the In-
ternational Legal System 2–5 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter Commitment 
and Compliance], for a leading study that settles on this distinction. 
62 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 712–13 & n.10 (quoting Jan Klabbers, The Re-
dundancy of Soft Law, 65 Nordic J. Int’l L. 167, 168, 181 (1996)); see also Kal Raustiala, 
Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 581, 581–82 (2005) (distin-
guishing between form and substance in international agreements, as opposed to “hard 
law” and “soft law”). 
63 See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 401, 401–03 
(2000); John King Gamble et al., Human-Centric International Law: A Model and a Search for 
Empirical Indicators, 14 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 61, 72 (2005) (“[T]here has been a signifi-
cant expansion in the range of activities governed by multilateral treaties, with the greatest 
increase occurring in the economic sphere. The metaphor of a rising tide seems appropri-
ate.”); Tom Ginsburg & Gregory Shaffer, How Does International Law Work?, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 753, 754–56 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer 
eds., 2010). 
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aims. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal advance a concept of legali-
zation that provides a useful tool for understanding actors’ choices in 
terms of an agreement’s characteristics.64 International agreements, 
they maintain, can be usefully viewed as varying across three dimen-
sions: (1) obligation, (2) precision of rules, and (3) delegation to a 
third-party decision-maker. Taken together, these characteristics can 
give an agreement a “harder” or “softer” legal character.65 
 Hard and soft law can thus be distinguished in terms of variation 
along a spectrum. Hard law, as an ideal type, “refers to legally binding 
obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudica-
tion or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority 
for interpreting and implementing the law.”66 By contrast, “[t]he realm 
of ‘soft law’ begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or 
more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation.”67 Be-
cause international agreements almost invariably exhibit different 
weaknesses along one or more of these dimensions, they can be viewed 
in terms of having harder or softer law characteristics. For instance, if 
an agreement is not formally binding on the parties, it is softer in this 
first sense. If a formally binding agreement is vague, however, it exhibits 
softer characteristics along the precision dimension because it enables 
the parties to exercise almost complete discretion as to its implementa-
tion.68 Finally, if an agreement fails to provide a monitoring or en-
forcement mechanism, then the agreement is softer along this third 
dimension because there is no third-party to resolve interpretive dis-
putes arising out of the agreement’s implementation.69 Without a third-
party interpreting the legal provisions which govern a dispute, the par-
ties to the dispute can discursively justify their acts more easily in legal-
istic terms, and with less consequence, whether in terms of reputational 
                                                                                                                      
64 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 714. 
65 Abbott, supra note 63, at 401–06; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance, 54 Int’l Org. 421, 422–24 (2001) (working within the 
“rational design” approach to international institutions described in Barbara Koremenos, 
Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 Int’l 
Org. 761, 762 (2001)); Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 714; see also Andrew T. Guzman, 
The Design of International Agreements, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 579, 581–82 (2005). For an almost 
simultaneous use of these three attributes to differentiate harder from softer international 
law, see A.E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 Int’l & 
Comp. L.Q. 901, 901–13 (1999). 
66 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 421. 
67 See id. at 422; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 714. 
68 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 715. 
69 Id. 
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costs or other sanctions.70 Such a third party could, at a minimum, pro-
vide a “focal point” around which parties can reassess their positions.71 
 Although some scholars have questioned this characterization of 
law in terms of these three attributes,72 we believe that this framework 
provides a clear, nuanced, and theoretically neutral framework for op-
erationalizing the hard- and soft-law distinction in terms of interna-
tional law’s development.73 Their conceptualization presents a spec-
trum of choices facing state and non-state actors, as opposed to a bi-
nary one, and it does not prejudge the value or effectiveness of these 
choices, all of which renders it particularly useful for our analyses of 
how hard and soft law interact.74 
C. Hard and Soft Law as Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists 
 This Section summarizes our existing argument about the three 
manners in which actors may deploy hard and soft law.75 First, we ex-
amine how these two forms of law may exist as alternatives, exploring 
the relative advantages and weaknesses of both hard and soft law.76 We 
next explore the use of hard and soft law as complements, whereby soft 
law either evolves into hard law or is used to fill gaps in hard-law in-
struments.77 Finally, we consider a scenario commonly overlooked by 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id.; see Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive 
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229, 1236 (2004). 
71 See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 70, at 1236 (addressing how international liti-
gation can “construct[] a focal point around which parties coordinate,” such that “third-
party signals cause players to update their beliefs about the state of the world”); Shaffer & 
Pollack, supra note 2, at 715. 
72 See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer 
Views of Law and Politics, 55 Int’l Org. 743, 744–46 (2001). 
73 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 421–23. 
74 Id.; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 717. Positivist definitions of hard law that fo-
cus on formal obligation and constructivist definitions that focus on effective obedience 
preclude (or at least do not facilitate) analysis of the interaction of hard and soft law as 
antagonists. See Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities of International 
Organizations, 40 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 87, 89 (2008) (writing that “[t]he term soft law 
describes norms that are formally non-binding but habitually obeyed”). Yet if soft law 
means habitually obeyed non-binding norms, we cannot assess the impact of such norms 
because the impact falls within the very definition. See id. For an earlier view of the concep-
tion of hard and soft law as lying along a continuum, see Michael Reisman, The Concept and 
Functions of Soft Law in International Politics, in Essays in honour of Judge Taslim Ola-
wale Elias 135, 138 (Emmanuel G. Bello & Bola A. Ajibola eds., 1992). 
75 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 717–41. 
76 See infra notes 79–96 and accompanying text. 
77 See infra notes 97–108 and accompanying text. 
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other scholars in the field: the deliberate use of hard and soft law as 
antagonists.78 
                                                                                                                     
1. As Alternatives 
 To effect specific policy goals, state and private actors increasingly 
turn to legal instruments that are harder or softer in manners that best 
align with such proposals.79 These variations in precision, obligation, 
and third-party delegation can be used strategically to advance both 
international and domestic policy goals. Much of the existing literature 
examines the relative strengths and weaknesses of hard and soft law for 
the states that make it. It is important, for our purposes, to address 
these purported advantages in order to assess the implications of the 
interaction of hard and soft law on each other. 
 Hard law as an institutional form features a number of advan-
tages.80 Hard law instruments, for example, allow states to commit 
themselves more credibly to international agreements by increasing the 
costs of reneging. They do so by imposing legal sanctions or by raising 
the costs to a state’s reputation where the state has acted in violation of 
its legal commitments.81 In addition, hard law treaties may have the 
advantage of creating direct legal effects in national jurisdictions, again 
increasing the incentives for compliance.82 They may solve problems of 
incomplete contracting by creating mechanisms for the interpretation 
and elaboration of legal commitments over time,83 including through 
the use of dispute settlement bodies such as courts.84 In different ways, 
they thus permit states to monitor, clarify, and enforce their commit-
ments. Hard law, as a result, can create more legal certainty. States, as 
well as private actors working with and through state representatives, 
 
78 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 723 (charting the theories of hard and soft law 
and illustrating the theoretical void surrounding their potential antagonistic interaction); 
infra notes 109–154 and accompanying text. 
79 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 717. 
80 For a more detailed examination of these advantages and disadvantages, see Shaffer 
& Pollack, supra note 2, at 717–21. 
81 Guzman, supra note 65, at 581–82, 595–97; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 
425; Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 Int’l Org. 495, 508 
(1991) (“The more formal and public the agreement, the higher the reputational costs of 
noncompliance.”). 
82 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 436–40. In the United States, such treaties are 
called “self-executing.” See id. at 438. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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should use hard law where “the benefits of cooperation are great but 
the potential for opportunism and its costs are high.”85 
 The advantages of hard law, however, come at a significant cost.86 
Because hard law creates formal commitments that restrict the behav-
ior of states, infringing on national sovereignty in potentially sensitive 
areas, states may bargain fiercely and at length over hard-law agree-
ments. Hard-law agreements also can be more difficult to amend to 
adapt to changing circumstances.87 As a result, according to sociolegal 
scholars, hard law is most problematic where it: (1) presupposes a fixed 
condition when situations of uncertainty demand constant experimen-
tation and adjustment, (2) requires uniformity when a tolerance of na-
tional diversity is needed, or (3) is difficult to change when frequent 
change may be essential.88 
 Soft law instruments can thus offer significant offsetting advantages 
over hard law because they are less costly to negotiate and come with 
lower “sovereignty costs.”89 Moreover, they provide greater flexibility for 
states to cope with uncertainty and learn over time. Thus, they allow 
states to be more ambitious and engage in “deeper” cooperation than 
they would if they had to worry about enforcement.90 Soft law, scholars 
argue, can “facilitate constitutive processes such as persuasion, learning, 
argumentation, and socialisation.”91 In other words, without the con-
straint of being bound in the future by binding agreements, states and 
other actors may engage in open-ended deliberation over the nature of 
particular challenges and the relative merits of alternative courses of 
                                                                                                                      
85 Id. at 429. 
86 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 718–19. 
87 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 433. 
88 See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., ‘Soft Law,’ ‘Hard Law’ and EU Integration, in Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US 65, 66–67 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott 
eds., 2006); see also Joanne Scott & Gráinne de Búrca, Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism, in Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, supra, at 1. 
89 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 718–19. 
90 For good discussions on the purported strengths of soft law, see Hard Choices, su-
pra note 1, at 4–5; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 444–47; Lipson, supra note 81, at 500–
01, 514–27 (discussing the strengths of “informal agreements”); Francesco Sindico, Soft 
Law and the Elusive Quest for Sustainable Global Governance, 19 Leiden J. Int’l L. 829, 832 
(2006) (reviewing Hard Choices, supra note 1); and Trubek, supra note 88, at 66–67. 
91 Trubek, supra note 88, at 75; David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft 
Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 Eur. 
L.J. 343, 353 (2005) (noting how the proponents of soft law find that its use is particularly 
appropriate when there is uncertainty and a vast amount of diversity among participants, 
requiring a need for experimentation, flexibility, and revisability in transnational processes 
of cooperation and coordination). 
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action.92 Given these potential advantages, Abbott and Snidal maintain 
that states may rationally choose soft-law instruments where contracting 
costs increase, whether because of the number of parties involved, fac-
tual uncertainty, domestic ratification challenges, or the politically 
charged nature of the issue.93 On the other hand, of course, soft law 
also has disadvantages, notably in that the credibility of commitments 
and the costs of reneging are reduced, thus reducing legal certainty.94 
                                                                                                                     
 In sum, depending on the context, hard- and soft-law instruments 
may afford different advantages.95 This conclusion has led a growing 
number of scholars in law and political science to advocate a pragmatic 
approach to the choice of one form of instrument over another, select-
ing alternative hard- or soft-law approaches depending on the charac-
teristics of the issue and the negotiating and institutional context in 
question.96 
2. As Complements 
 In the face of this ongoing debate about the relative merits of hard 
and soft law, a growing number of scholars have reframed the issue, 
concluding that hard and soft law can instead “interact and build upon 
each other as complementary tools for international problem-solving.”97 
These scholars contend that hard- and soft-law mechanisms can build 
 
92 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 446–47; Trubek, supra note 88, at 75. 
93 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, in The 
Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Per-
spectives 50, 54, 62, 70 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004); Shaffer & Pollack, 
supra note 2, at 720. 
94 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 Nordic J. Int’l L. 381, 381–91 
(1998); Sindico, supra note 90, at 846; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in Interna-
tional Law?, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 413, 414–16 (1983). Positivist legal scholars, for example, find 
that soft law is inferior to hard law because it lacks formally binding obligations that can be 
interpreted and enforced by courts. See Klabbers, supra, at 382, 387–88 (speculating that soft-
law arguments fail to persuade courts, and are instead analyzed under a binding/nonbinding 
framework). For this reason, these scholars view soft law as a second-best alternative to hard 
law, either as a way-station on the way to hard law, or as a fall-back when hard law approaches 
fail. See Sindico, supra note 90, at 846 (concluding that “[s]oft law, and voluntary standards in 
particular, are a stage in the creation of international legal norms”). 
95 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 720. 
96 See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 65, at 423 (noting that although “soft law is 
sometimes designed as a way station to harder legalization, . . . [it is] often . . . preferable 
on its own terms”). 
97 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 721 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Bane, supra note 
1, at 347; Dinah Shelton, Multilateral Arms Control, in Commitment and Compliance, supra 
note 61, at 465, 466. 
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upon each other in two primary ways.98 First, non-binding soft law can 
lead the way to binding hard law.99 Second, soft-law instruments can 
subsequently elaborate existing hard law.100 In both cases, hard interna-
tional law is progressively developed.101 
 Existing international law and international relations scholarship 
commonly takes this approach. For example, in addition to clarifying 
the definition of hard and soft law, Abbott and Snidal have identified 
different “pathways to cooperation” which explicitly involve the pro-
gressive hardening of soft law.102 They observe, first, how states may 
sometimes start with a framework convention which subsequently dee-
pens in the precision of its coverage.103 Second, they note how non-
binding soft-law instruments can lead to normative consensus which 
gives rise to new, binding hard-law commitments.104 Christine Chinkin 
likewise explains how soft law can be both “elaborative” of hard law (by 
providing guidance to the interpretation of existing hard law), and sub-
sequently accepted as “emergent hard law” (by facilitating the building 
of hard customary international law).105 Likewise, David Trubek and 
his co-authors contend that soft-law instruments can help to generate 
knowledge, develop shared ideas, build trust, and establish “non-
binding standards that can eventually harden into binding rules once 
uncertainties are reduced and a higher degree of consensus ensues.”106 
 In sum, where a body of hard law already exists, soft law is often 
considered to provide a low-cost and flexible way to elaborate and fill in 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Dinah Shelton, Multilateral Arms Control, in Commitment and Compliance, supra 
note 61, at 466. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 721. 
102 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 54–55 (“[T]hree pathways are: (1) the use of 
a framework convention which subsequently deepens in the precision of its coverage, (2) 
the use of a plurilateral agreement which subsequently broadens in its membership, and 
(3) the use of a soft-law instrument which subsequently leads to binding legal commit-
ments.”). 
103 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 55–57. 
104 Id. at 59–60. 
105 Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in Com-
mitment and Compliance, supra note 61, at 30–31 (making the point specifically as re-
gards to international security law as well); see Shelton, supra note 97, at 466 (“In such a 
system [regarding international security], it might be expected that non-binding norms 
would have little role to play, but the reality is that they serve both as precursors to binding 
agreements and as subsequent norms to fill in the technical gaps where complex technical 
regulation is required.”). 
106 Trubek, supra note 88, at 89; see also Janet Koven Levit, The Dynamics of International 
Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, 45 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 65, 132–41 (2004); Trubek & Trubek, supra note 91, at 355–59. 
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the gaps that form when a standing body of hard law encounters new 
and unforeseen circumstances.107 Where a body of hard law does not 
yet exist, on the other hand, states and other actors can use soft-law in-
struments until these actors develop greater comfort and consensus 
regarding the merits and advisability of an approach. Legal scholars 
thus view hard- and soft-law instruments not only as providing alterna-
tive tools for cooperation. They show how these instruments serve as 
complements in “dynamic processes of legalization,” leading to the 
progressive development of international law over time.108 What these 
and other studies do not systematically address, however, is how—and 
under what conditions—actors can, and do, deploy hard- and soft-law 
instruments to undercut each other. 
3. As Antagonists 
 As we have observed in our previous scholarship, the existing ana-
lyses of hard and soft law tend to begin by assuming that mutual gains 
from cooperation among states are achievable.109 These analyses then 
proceed to explore the advantages and disadvantages, the choice, and 
the effectiveness of hard- and soft- law approaches to achieve these 
gains. Some of this literature certainly recognizes that soft law can be 
used in an antagonistic fashion.110 For example, in an early article on 
soft law, Christine Chinkin acknowledges that soft law “has both a le-
gitimising and delegitimising direct effect. . . . While there is no doc-
trine of desuetude in international law, the legitimacy of a previously 
existing norm of international law may be undermined by emerging 
principles of soft law.”111 Similarly, Michael Reisman of the New Haven 
School early noted the challenge of the rise of soft law in terms of gen-
erating an “inconsistent normativity to the point where, in critical mat-
ters, international law has become like a camera whose every shot is a 
double exposure.”112 
 Yet the literature has yet to assess systematically the conditions un-
der which actors are likely to deploy hard and soft law as antagonists 
                                                                                                                      
107 See Commitment and Compliance, supra note 61, at 466. 
108 Id.; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 722; see, e.g., Chinkin, supra note 1, at 856–59. 
109 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 722. 
110 E.g., Chinkin, supra note 1, at 866; Reisman, supra note 74, at 144. 
111 Chinkin, supra note 1, at 866. 
112 Reisman, supra note 74, at 144 (referencing in particular the developing country 
push in the UN GA for a new international economic order). 
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instead of complements. What we need, in this respect, is to build a 
conditional theory of international law.113 
 The perception of mutual gain is certainly an important prerequi-
site for international cooperation. Yet the harmonious, complementary 
interaction of hard- and soft-law approaches to international coopera-
tion relies on a hitherto unspecified set of scope conditions. By scope 
conditions, we refer to the conditions under which a particular event or 
class of events is likely to occur.114 In the case of the interaction of hard 
and soft law as complements, the primary scope condition is a low level 
of distributive conflict among states, and in particular among powerful 
states. Second, the proliferation of international organizations in dis-
tinct functional areas of international law gives rise to legal fragmenta-
tion and “regime complexes.”115 Existing accounts of complementary 
interaction of hard and soft law appear to implicitly assume that dis-
tributive conflict among states, and hence the incentive to engage in 
forum shopping and strategic inconsistency, are low.116 These condi-
tions may hold in certain areas, but variation in distributive conflict and 
the opportunities offered by regimes and fora with overlapping juris-
diction should result in actors using hard- and soft-law instruments in 
different ways, including sometimes as antagonists. Under conditions of 
high distributive conflict and high regime complexity, we are likely to 
see hard and soft law often interacting as antagonists. 
a. Distributive Conflict 
 Despite the general promise of international law and international 
regimes in fostering international cooperation to achieve mutual gains, 
international relations scholars have identified a number of potential 
obstacles to successful international cooperation.117 International law 
                                                                                                                      
 
113 See Ginsburg & Shaffer, supra note 63, at 780–81. 
114 See Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
and Framework, 59 Int’l Org. 801, 803 (2005) (defining scope conditions as “when and 
under what conditions a particular . . . outcome is more likely”). 
115 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 722; see Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime 
Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 Int’l Org. 277, 279 (2004); Study Group of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversifi-
cation and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 6, 15, 490, 493, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 
13, 2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation of International Law] (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi). 
116 Raustiala & Victor, supra note 115, at 298 (using the term “strategic inconsistency” 
to describe “explicit efforts to create conflicts to force change in another regime”). 
117 See Andreas Hasenclever et al., Theories of International Regimes 113–35 
(1997) (providing a nuanced analysis attempting to reconcile Grieco with his critics); Jo-
seph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism, 42 Int’l Org. 485, 487 (1988); Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 730 
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theorists have often drawn from regime theory in international rela-
tions to assess the role of international law in fostering cooperation. 
They most frequently point to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (“PD”) game, 
from game theory, in assessing the role of international law to facilitate 
mutually beneficial outcomes.118 In the classic PD model, states are as-
sumed to have a common interest in reaching a cooperative outcome, 
but fear that the other state may cheat on the agreement impedes such 
mutually-beneficial cooperation.119 To address such problems, PD 
models of international relations typically provide for monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms to ensure compliance with the terms of the 
agreement.120 If PD is an accurate description of the situation facing 
states, then international hard and soft law should indeed facilitate co-
operation by clarifying understandings, by creating institutions to mon-
itor compliance with them, and (in some cases) by providing for legal 
enforcement.121 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma game, however, ignores another impor-
tant obstacle to successful cooperation, namely conflicts over the distri-
bution of the costs and benefits of cooperation.122 The distributive con-
flict to which we are referring relates not only to the problem of relative 
gains in relation to the balance of state power, but also to the distribu-
                                                                                                                      
(“The realist literature, for example, emphasizes the dual challenges of (1) cheating and 
(2) relative gains as the primary obstacles to successful cooperation, focusing on concerns 
over national security and the balance of power.”). See generally Neorealism and Neolib-
eralism: The Contemporary Debate (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (presenting the com-
peting neorealist and neoliberal views on international politics with respect to focal points 
including anarchy, international cooperation, and relative versus absolute gains). Subse-
quent work by neoliberal institutionalists, however, has found that international regimes 
can mitigate concerns about cheating, while concerns over relative gains operate only 
under certain restrictive conditions. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 730 n.64; see, e.g., 
Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory, 85 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 1303, 1305–06, 1309–15 (1991); Duncan Snidal, International Cooperation Among Rela-
tive Gains Maximizers, 35 Int’l Stud. Q. 387, 388–89, 400–02 (1991). 
118 See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice 
Theory 29–33 (2008); Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 731; Snidal, supra note 117, at 
390–91. 
119 See Guzman, supra note 118, at 30–31 (“[T]he parties can maximize their total joint 
payoff through mutual cooperation . . . but the dominant strategy for each side was to 
cheat.”). 
120 See Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supra-
national Institutions 29–32 (2000). 
121 See id. 
122 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 731–32; see, e.g., Gruber, supra note 120, at 33–
38; Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 
43 World Pol. 336, 336 (1991). 
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tion of absolute gains from cooperation among two or more states.123 
When states cooperate in international politics, they are not faced with 
a binary choice between “cooperation” and “defection” as in PD 
games.124 Instead, states choose among specific terms of cooperation, 
which can raise distributive concerns.125 
 International relations scholars such as Stephen Krasner thus argue 
that efforts at international cooperation do not reflect a PD game, but 
rather more closely approximate a Battle of the Sexes game from a 
game theoretic perspective.126 In the Battle of the Sexes game, states 
have clear preferences for different international rules and standards.127 
Thus, even though a common rule or standard would raise the prospect 
of joint gains among all states, states may nevertheless disagree on the 
specific standard to be chosen, because it would affect the distribution 
of those gains. Put in law and economics terms, there are many points 
along a “Pareto frontier” on which states can cooperate.128 The primary 
                                                                                                                      
123 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 730–31 & n.65. “In other words,” as we noted 
earlier, “the existence of distributive conflict—that is, conflict over the distribution of the 
gains of cooperation—should not be confused with a zero-sum game, in which one player’s 
gain is necessarily another’s loss. Instead, the game-theoretic models discussed below, such 
as Battle of the Sexes, are generally mixed-motive games where joint gains are possible, but 
states disagree about the distribution of those gains.” Id. at 730 n.65. For a range of views 
on the challenge of distributive conflict in international cooperation, see, for example, 
Krasner, supra 122, at 336, finding that “[g]lobal communications have been characterized 
not by Nash equilibria that are Pareto suboptimal but rather by disagreements over which 
point along the Pareto frontier should be chosen, that is, by distributional conflicts rather 
than by market failure.” See also Gruber, supra note 120, at 20–32, 275–78 (2000); Daniel 
W. Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes 
51–59 (2007); James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 
Int’l Org. 269, 276–77, 296–99 (1998); Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 761–62; Walter 
Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of 
Power?, 56 World Pol. 1, 18–22 (2003); James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of Interna-
tional Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 Int’l Org. 387, 388–89 (1994). 
124 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 732. 
125 E.g., Morrow, supra note 123, at 395 (“There is only one way to cooperate in prison-
ers' dilemma; there are many ways to cooperate in the real world.”). 
126 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 733–34; see Krasner, supra note 122, at 339. 
127 Krasner, supra note 122, at 339; Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Re-
gimes in an Anarchic World, 36 Int’l Org. 299, 309–13, 324 (1982). 
128 Krasner, supra note 122, at 336. In game-theoretic terms, a Pareto-optimal outcome 
is one in which no player can be made better off without another being made worse off, 
and the Pareto frontier is defined as the collection of such points. See id. In a PD game, the 
starting point is assumed to be Pareto-suboptimal, in the sense that both players could be 
made better off by cooperating, but only a single cooperative equilibrium is defined, ob-
scuring potential distributional conflicts between the players. See id. In Battle, by contrast, 
there are multiple cooperative equilibria along the Pareto frontier, with different distribu-
tive implications, and the central question is which point will be chosen. See, e.g., Hasen-
clever, supra note 117, at 104–13. 
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question becomes “not whether to move toward the ‘Pareto frontier’ of 
mutually beneficial cooperation, but rather which point on the Pareto 
frontier will be chosen.”129 Some international relations scholars have 
generalized this insight, showing that distributive conflict is not unique 
to Battle of the Sexes games, but rather emerges as a “generic and near-
ly ubiquitous feature of all international cooperation.”130 
 The role of state power thus becomes salient in the assessment of 
struggles over the terms of international cooperation.131 Put bluntly, 
acknowledgement of power and its significance is no longer (if it ever 
was) the exclusive province of realist international relations theory, but 
is increasingly an element in other approaches to international rela-
tions and international law.132 As we have argued previously, “the 
emerging picture of international . . . cooperation is one in which dif-
ferences in power matter greatly in the adoption and implementation 
of international legal rules” and standards.133 For our purposes in this 
Article, we expect the interaction of hard and soft law to be shaped sig-
nificantly by the preferences of powerful states, and to a lesser extent by 
groups of other states that “attempt to thwart the aims of powerful 
countries through the strategic deployment of international legal in-
struments.”134 
                                                                                                                      
129 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 734. 
130 Id. at 735 (citing Fearon, supra note 123, at 270). 
131 Krasner, supra note 122, at 340. 
132 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 729; see, e.g., John Braithwaite & Peter Dra-
hos, Global Business Regulation 564–71 (2000); Drezner, supra note 123, at 55–59; 
Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance, in Power in Global Gov-
ernance, supra note 25, at 1–4; Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal 
Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 369, 370–71 (2005); 
Mattli & Büthe, supra note 123, at 18–22, 40–42. 
133 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 729. Ours and others’ previous work regarding 
international economic law, for example, have emphasized potential distributive conflict 
among states that stand to gain differentially from various proposed standards, and have 
suggested that differences in power resources tend to determine substantive standards and 
distributive outcomes. See Mattli & Büthe, supra note 123, at 4; Pollack & Shaffer, The Future 
of Transatlantic Economic Relations: Continuity Amid Discord, in The Future of Transatlan-
tic Economic Relations 3, 5–7 (David M. Andrews, Mark A. Pollack, Gregory C. Shaffer, 
& Helen Wallace eds., 2005). Daniel Drezner goes further, arguing that agreement among 
economically powerful states—and in particular between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, the dominant economic players on the world stage—is a necessary condition 
for any successful regulatory regime. Drezner, supra note 123, at 5. 
134 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 730. 
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b. Regime Complexity and Legal Fragmentation 
 Regime theory in its earliest iterations tended not to address the 
problem of multiple, overlapping regimes.135 Krasner’s formulation of 
the classic definition of regimes, for example, identifies regimes as “prin-
cipals, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which ac-
tor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”136 Real-world problems, 
however, are increasingly unlikely to fall neatly within the jurisdiction of a 
single regime, but rather lie at the intersection of multiple regimes, 
which results in a regime complex.137 
 As we explain in our related earlier work, decision making in these 
regime complexes is characterized by several distinctive features. These 
most notably include: (1) a negotiation framework within a given re-
gime that begins not with a blank slate but rather by considering devel-
opments in related international regimes,138 (2) a tendency for indi-
vidual states to engage in “forum shopping” by selecting particular re-
gimes that are most likely to support their preferred outcomes,139 and 
(3) a tendency for states to engage in “strategic inconsistency” by at-
tempting to use one regime to create conflict or inconsistency with an-
                                                                                                                      
135 Id. at 737. 
136 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables, in International Regimes 1, 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (emphasis add-
ed); Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 737. 
137 Raustiala & Victor, supra note 115, at 279. Regime complex has been defined as “an ar-
ray of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-
area.” Id. For important related work, see generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The 
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 1 (2004) and Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in 
the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 362 (2006). 
138 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 738. 
139 Id. at 738. We further noted, 
[S]tates will select regimes based on characteristics such as [the regime’s] 
membership (e.g., bilateral, restricted, or universal), voting rules, (e.g., one-
state-one-vote vs. weighted voting or consensus vs. majority voting), institu-
tional characteristics (e.g., presence or absence of dispute-settlement proce-
dures), substantive focus (e.g., trade finance, environment, or food safety), 
and predominant functional representation (e.g., by trade, finance, environ-
ment, or agricultural ministries) . . . . 
Id. 
For an excellent discussion of forum-shopping in international relations, see generally 
Joseph Jupille & Duncan Snidal, The Choice of International Institutions: Cooperation, 
Alternatives and Strategies ( July 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://sobek.colorado.edu/~jupille/research/20060707-Jupille-Snidal.pdf. Powerful states 
are likely to be particularly adept at such forum shopping. See Drezner, supra note 123, at 
5, 58–59; Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and 
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 595, 599–600 (2007). 
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other.140 In this way, states can aim to shift the understanding or adap-
tation of rules in that other regime in a particular direction. 
                                                                                                                     
 The growing legal literature about the “fragmentation” of interna-
tional law, as identified in a long report of the International Law Com-
mission complements this political science analysis of overlapping re-
gimes.141 Legal scholars have noted how the result of such fragmenta-
tion is potential conflict between international legal regimes.142 From 
the perspective of hard and soft law interaction, the existence of legal 
fragmentation and regime complexity can create overlaps and inconsis-
tencies among harder and softer forms of international law within a 
given regime complex. 
c. Combining the Two Factors 
 The existence of distributive conflict and regime complexity are 
often linked. On the one hand, distributive conflict provides states with 
incentives to forum-shop among different regimes within a regime 
complex, and to create new regimes deliberately to support their own 
positions and undermine those of the other side.143 On the other hand, 
although distributive conflict creates incentives for actors to use hard 
and soft law as antagonists, the existence of fragmented regime com-
plexes provides opportunities and thus facilitates their ability to do so. 
It is precisely the effect of distributive conflicts among states, coupled 
with the existence of a regime complex, that is most likely to under-
mine the smooth and complementary interaction of hard and soft law 
depicted in so much of the literature.144 
 In sum, under the condition of high distributive conflict over the 
terms of international law, states and other actors may deliberately use 
soft-law instruments to undermine hard-law rules to which they object 
 
140 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 738. 
141 Id. at 739; see, e.g., Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 115, ¶¶ 1, 9, 491–
493. For related literature on legal pluralism in a fragmented international legal system, 
see Paul Shiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155, 1164–69 (2007) and 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 999, 1004–07 (Michelle Ever-
son trans., 2004). 
142 See, e.g., Mireille Delmas-Marty, Trois Défis Pour un Droit Mondial 104 
(1998); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International 
Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 791, 792, 796–
98 (1999); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 553, 557–58 (2002); Simon Roberts, After Government? On 
Representing Law Without the State, 68 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 11–13 (2005). 
143 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
144 See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 745–48. 
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or, vice-versa, to create an antagonistic relationship between these legal 
instruments. The existence of regime complexity facilitates the ability 
of states and other actors to do so. 
 In our previous scholarship, we distilled our argument about hard 
and soft law into the four possible combinations of distributive conflict 
and regime complexity, summarized in Table 1.145 
 
Table 1: Distributive Conflict, Regime Complexes, and the Interaction of Hard and 
Soft Law 
 Dist. Conflict Low Dist. Conflict High 
 
 Single, Isolated Regime Complementary interaction 
of hard and soft law, as per 
existing literature. 
Possible antagonistic inter-
action of hard and soft law 
within the regime, al-
though opportunities lim-
ited by invariant member-
ships, rules, and substan-
tive content of regime. 
 
 Regime Complex Possible complementary in-
teraction of hard and soft 
law, although differing 
memberships, rules and sub-
stantive foci may render co-
ordination difficult even in 
the absence of major dis-
tributive conflicts.  
Likely antagonistic interac-
tion of hard and soft law 
between regimes with dif-
ferent decision-making 
rules, memberships and 
substantive foci. 
 
 The existing literature has tended to focus on isolated regimes with 
low levels of distributive conflict, as depicted in the upper left-hand 
cell.146 Under such circumstances, states likely lack any incentive to un-
dermine existing law, and will use hard and soft law in complementary 
ways.147 Where distributive conflict is again low, but regime complexes 
coexist with no hierarchical structure, as when an issue-area comprises 
multiple functional domains, one would not expect states to contest or 
undermine existing legal provisions, but would instead anticipate some 
coordination problems among regimes with different membership 
rules, substantive foci, and predominant functional representation.148 
                                                                                                                      
145 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 746 (illustrating our expectations about the in-
teraction of hard and soft law under different combinations of distributive conflict and 
regime complexity). 
146 E.g., Krasner, supra note 122, at 337. 
147 See id. 
148 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 746–47 & n.110. 
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 By contrast, in the upper right-hand cell where distributive conflict 
is high and states engage in distributive conflict within a single, isolated 
regime, states will have an incentive to contest existing legal provisions, 
but will lack the opportunity to do so due to the decision-making rules 
under which most international organizations operate.149 This scenario 
would likely occur infrequently, however, because distributive conflict 
among states furnishes a significant incentive for disadvantaged states 
to search for an alternative forum or, failing that, to press for the crea-
tion of another regime to compete with or undermine the existing re-
gime.150 The choice to forum shop or to create new regimes is thus, in 
part, endogenous to the presence of distributive conflict.151 
 We therefore expect this dynamic to push outcomes from the up-
per right-hand cell to the lower right-hand cell, because where distribu-
tive conflicts are present and multiple regimes overlap regarding a sin-
gle issue-area, states enjoy both an incentive and an opportunity to fo-
rum shop.152 In doing so, states can use hard and soft law strategically 
to achieve their aims. In sum, where distributive conflict over the terms 
of international agreement is ubiquitous, and where a given issue falls 
under multiple regimes in the “ever-thickening web of international 
norms, rules, and institutions,” we expect actors to deploy hard and soft 
law so that they interact antagonistically.153 Moreover, we expect to find 
this pattern across a broad range of issues in international law across 
sustained periods.154 
D. Four Hypotheses 
 Our theoretical framework from our previous scholarship leads to 
four general, testable hypotheses regarding the interaction of hard and 
soft law that are equally as applicable in the international security con-
text as they were in the international trade context.155 We briefly restate 
these hypotheses before exploring their application within the field of 
international security. 
                                                                                                                      
149 Id. at 747 & n.111 (explaining that “most international organizations operate by 
consensus decision making so that any state benefitting from existing law could block 
adoption of countervailing legal instruments”). 
150 Id. at 747. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 748. 
154 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 748. 
155 Id. at 765–98. 
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Hypothesis 1. Where distributive conflict is low between powerful 
states, they are likely to deploy hard and soft law to work as comple-
ments in an evolutionary manner.156 
 Where powerful actors in the realm of international economic law, 
such as the United States and the European Union (EU), agree on a 
particular international policy or rule, scholars have commonly argued 
that it is much easier for them to promote it globally.157 For instance, 
Daniel Drezner contends that, in general, agreement between the 
United States and the EU is both a “necessary and sufficient condition” 
for successful international regulation.158 We hypothesize that “the in-
teraction of hard and soft law as complements, presented as a general 
rule in much or all of the existing [international law] literature, in fact 
operates only under a restrictive set of conditions, namely a broad pol-
icy consensus among the most powerful actors within a given issue-
area.”159 In this sense, the existing literature is not so much incorrect as 
it is guilty of selection bias, focusing on the subset of cases most condu-
cive to the complementary interaction of hard and soft law. 
 Examples of such complementary interaction are widespread in 
the literature, which often focuses on U.S. and European cooperative 
endeavors. Historically, the United States has played a leading role in 
the success of a number of international regulatory cooperation initia-
tives, ranging from international agreements to protect the ozone 
layer,160 to anti-bribery conventions,161 to the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations.162 The initial instruments deployed in both the ozone 
and anti-bribery cases were of a soft-law nature, but the parties turned 
to hard-law agreements after EU members were convinced of the bene-
fits of such an approach. The EU, however, has played an increasingly 
entrepreneurial role in global governance, from standard-setting to 
climate change to financial regulation, attributable in large part to the 
increased institutionalization and harmonization of European regula-
                                                                                                                      
156 Id. at 765. 
157 Id. at 765 & nn.194–95. 
158 Drezner, supra note 123, at 5. 
159 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 765. 
160 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 11, Mar. 22, 1985, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
161 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1. 
162 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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tion at the EU level.163 Looking beyond these contemporary cases of 
international economic regulation, we can expect that, where great 
powers (which can vary over time and by issue-area) agree, soft law will 
both elaborate existing hard law and build over time into new hard law, 
as contemplated in the existing literature. 
Hypothesis 2. Where distributive conflict among powerful states is 
high, we are more likely to see them deploy hard and soft law in opposi-
tion to each other, often by working through different international re-
gimes and fora. These overlapping hard- and soft-law regimes and fo-
ra, in turn, may come into conflict. When they do, the soft-law regimes 
and fora can lose some of their technocratic, flexible, and deliberative 
features, and the hard-law regimes and fora can become less clear and 
determinate in their requirements. Where distributive conflict is ongo-
ing, international legal instruments will not simply converge into a 
new synthesis, but may remain in conflict for a prolonged period.164 
 Intense distributive conflict is likely to inhibit successful coopera-
tion, as it undermines agreement among powerful states.165 Powerful 
states engaged in distributive conflicts are likely to forum shop, advanc-
ing their interests by pressing for the adoption of legal provisions, both 
hard and soft, in fora that are most favorable to their respective posi-
tions. The resulting overlapping and incompatible regimes provide fa-
vorable conditions for the antagonistic interaction of hard and soft law. 
 Case studies of international economic regulation, in which the 
United States and the EU are the dominant powers, illustrate this pre-
diction.166 Because the United States and the EU possess relatively 
equal levels of economic power, each side can easily use its market 
power to counteract the other—and to seek out allies in existing or new 
fora—when the two sides disagree on a regulatory policy.167 Under 
such circumstances, the resulting agreement likely will either contain 
                                                                                                                      
163 See, e.g., Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 132, at 488–94; see also Elliot Posner, 
Market Power Without a Single Market: The New Transatlantic Relations in Financial Services, in 
The Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations, supra note 133, at 233, 233–36; cf. 
Andreas Nölke, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation on Accounting Standards: A ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’ Perspective, in Systemic Implications of Transatlantic Regulatory Coop-
eration and Competition 287, 287–90 (Simon J. Evenett & Robert M. Stern eds., 2011). 
164 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 767. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 768–73. 
167 See id. at 768. 
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vague terms, or will set in opposition competing international hard- 
and soft-law instruments.168 
                                                                                                                     
 We have earlier shown how the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
lies at the center of many of these inter-regime regulatory conflicts, giv-
en the WTO’s broad scope of coverage and its implications because of 
its hard-law dispute settlement system.169 For example, the United 
States and the EU have taken distinctive and sharply opposed ap-
proaches to the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
with the United States pursuing a more liberal and, what it calls, a “sci-
ence-based” approach to risks from GMOs, whereas the EU, reflecting 
prevailing European social norms, adopted a more precautionary sys-
tem requiring an onerous prior approval procedure for each geneti-
cally modified food or crop.170 Over the past two decades, both sides 
have attempted to export or “upload” their respective approaches to 
the global level, and both sides have actively forum-shopped.171 The 
United States has favored the hard-law WTO with its rules on non-tariff 
barriers to trade and its powerful dispute settlement system. The EU 
has favored other regimes, including the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion, a soft-law body establishing non-binding food-safety standards, 
and the Convention on Biodiversity (“CBD”), which is empowered to 
adopt rules relating to the environmental aspects of GMOs.172 The EU, 
faced with existing hard-law rules in the WTO that could be changed 
only by consensus, has attempted to constrain the impact of WTO rules 
by pressing for the adoption of more precautionary food-safety stan-
dards in the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and for a restrictive Bio-
diversity Protocol to the CBD.173 The result has not been a complemen-
tary relationship of hard and soft law, but one in which each side seeks 
deliberately to upload its own views as international law and to under-
mine or curtail competing international rules and standards. 
 
168 See id. 
169 Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The Inter-
national Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods 113–76 (2009); Shaffer & 
Pollack, supra note 2, at 752–65, 768–73; see also Claire R. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accom-
modation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes, 24 
Berkeley J. Int’l L. 79, 80–81 (2006). 
170 Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 169, at 150–52; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 
752–65. 
171 Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 169, at 150–66; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 
752–53. 
172 Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 169, at 158, 162–66. 
173 See id. 
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 This interaction of competing international hard and soft law has, 
in turn, affected the purported advantages of the hard and soft legal 
regimes in question. The soft-law Codex Alimentarius Commission, for 
example, normally meets at a technical level to deliberate about non-
binding food safety standards, but it has been politicized as each side 
has grasped the implications of Codex rules on the application of WTO 
hard law in WTO litigation.174 By contrast, there has been pressure on 
the quintessential hard-law regime of the WTO dispute-settlement sys-
tem to accommodate the norms set forth in neighboring international 
regimes. In WTO litigation over the EU’s regulation of GMOs, the EU 
pressed the WTO panel to take into account the neighboring interna-
tional regimes. The end result, we noted, was not a gradual clarification 
and elaboration of international law, as per the existing literature, but a 
deliberate and persistent muddying of the international legal waters.175 
Hypothesis 3. Even where powerful states agree on a common ap-
proach, smaller states that are adversely affected can use international 
hard- and soft-law strategies to attempt to thwart powerful states’ 
aims, again choosing regimes more favorable to their positions in a 
fragmented international law system. The result, once again, is hard 
and soft law acting as antagonists. Such interaction can potentially 
lead to less flexibility and deliberation in the soft-law regimes and fora, 
and less legal certainty provided by the hard-law ones. Powerful states 
nonetheless have significant advantages in these situations.176 
 The strategic use of hard and soft law is not exclusively the prov-
ince of powerful states.177 For less-developed countries and powerful 
countries alike, international law has important distributive implica-
tions.178 Intellectual property law is a prime example.179 These distribu-
tive implications create incentives for developing countries to use new 
                                                                                                                      
174 Id. at 171–76. 
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hard- or soft-law instruments to counter the less favorable existing in-
ternational law.180 In practice, the relative weakness of developing 
countries, coupled with their large numbers in forums such as the UN 
General Assembly, generally leads these states to adopt counter-norms 
in the form of soft-law provisions aimed at undermining or curtailing 
the effect of existing hard law.181 
 Laurence Helfer, in particular, has explored how developing coun-
tries can “engage in regime shifting,” adopting “the tools of soft lawmak-
ing.”182 Such countries often align themselves with sympathetic non-
governmental groups who help generate counter norms that are devel-
opment-oriented.183 As Helfer further demonstrated in the intellectual 
property context, developing countries sought to counter the creation 
of hard intellectual property rights under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of International Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) 
and bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements,184 which were closely modeled on 
U.S. and EU law, through forum-shifting tactics involving the CBD, 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), and the World 
Health Organization (WHO).185 These countries have sought to do so 
with respect to a number of issues involving biodiversity, plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, public health, and human rights, 
and they seek to generate “new principles, norms, and rules of intellec-
tual property protection” within these institutions that “are more closely 
aligned with these countries’ interests.”186 
Hypothesis 4. There is a spectrum from which states may choose in us-
ing hard- and soft-law instruments to counter existing international 
law. They will favor instruments with harder law characteristics (in 
terms of precision, obligation, and delegation) when their interests are 
certain and when they can obtain sufficient support from third coun-
tries. Where their interests are less clear, or where other states are able to 
block the adoption of hard-law provisions, states are more likely to op-
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186 Helfer, supra note 137, at 6, 61–62; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 776. 
1180 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1147 
pose existing international law provisions with new soft-law agree-
ments.187 
 The existing literature provides relatively clear arguments about 
why states choose among the alternatives of hard and soft law in light of 
their respective strengths and weaknesses. The focus here, in contrast, 
is on the choice of hard- and soft-law instruments in the context of on-
going distributive struggles among states seeking to influence outcomes 
in settings of legal fragmentation and regime complexity. 
 For a state that is certain of its interests and intent on either shap-
ing or undermining an existing regime, new hard-law provisions would 
most likely be preferable because they entail a legal obligation, ceteris 
paribus. Yet despite the advantages of hard law in promoting a state’s 
policy choices, states tend to choose instruments of a relatively softer 
law nature to counter existing hard law as an antagonist in practice.188 
They do so for two primary reasons. First, states may not wish to coun-
ter existing hard law with new conflicting hard law for systemic reasons, 
preferring instead to soften existing hard law indirectly by altering the 
interpretation of the existing law, and thus its precision and clarity.189 
Second, revisionist states, dissatisfied with existing regimes, may indeed 
press for conflicting hard-law provisions, but be unable to secure the 
agreement of other (status-quo) parties on such provisions.190 Conse-
quently, they may fall back on soft-law agreements as a second-best al-
ternative. Non-state actors, moreover, rely on soft law because it is the 
exclusive form of international lawmaking directly available to them 
without state allies.191 
 Against this theoretical backdrop, and in an effort to complement 
our earlier work on international economic regulation, this Article ex-
amines the interaction of specific hard- and soft-law instruments to test 
our hypotheses with respect to two critical questions of international 
security law, that of: (1) the legality of the threat or use of nuclear wea-
pons,192 and (2) the legality of humanitarian intervention under the 
                                                                                                                      
187 Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 2, at 788 (listed therein as Hypothesis 5). 
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“responsibility to protect” doctrine.193 In both cases, the UN Charter 
and other existing hard-law treaties have come under challenge from 
coalitions of states eager to undermine the purported legality of nu-
clear weapons and the absolute protection of state sovereignty, respec-
tively. In both cases, these coalitions—of less-developed countries in the 
first instance, of Western interventionist states in the second—sought 
to develop various legal instruments to undermine the pre-existing le-
gal consensus on these questions. The remainder of this Article shows 
how the resulting antagonistic interaction of hard and soft law is consis-
tent with the hypotheses we have laid out. 
II. The Legality of Nuclear Weapons 
 Nuclear weapons occupy a special place in international law. In-
troduced in 1945 during the final stages of World War II and never 
used in battle since the end of that conflict, nuclear weapons have nev-
ertheless proliferated in terms of both the number of weapons and the 
number of states in possession of them.194 For the five original nuclear 
powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China— 
nuclear weapons became the central element in the policy of nuclear 
deterrence that has been widely credited with preserving peace during 
the decades of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the devastating effects of 
nuclear weapons, the prospects of a full-scale nuclear exchange, and 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries such as India, 
Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, have raised fundamental questions 
about whether and how the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons 
can be reconciled with the basic principles of the UN Charter, interna-
tional humanitarian law, and other substantive areas of international 
law. 
A. Early Legal Provisions on Nuclear Weapons 
 In the period immediately following World War II, the interna-
tional legal approach to nuclear weapons was shaped largely by the 
small group of nuclear powers, including the United States and Great 
Britain (together with their nonnuclear NATO allies who relied on the 
extended deterrent of the American nuclear arsenal) and the Soviet 
Union (and its successor state, Russia), joined later by France and Chi-
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25, 40–50 (1998). 
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na.195 During the first several decades following the war, these powers 
generally asserted their legal right to create, acquire, and possess nu-
clear weapons, and to threaten their use as part of the strategy of deter-
rence, while at the same time accepting some binding legal limits on 
their nuclear arsenals through a series of bilateral, plurilateral, and 
multilateral agreements.196 Three bodies of international law are par-
ticularly relevant here, namely (1) the regime on nuclear testing, (2) a 
second series of primarily bilateral agreements on nuclear arms con-
trol, and (3) the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
 With regard to the first of these bodies of law, in 1963 the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain negotiated the Treaty Ban-
ning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (“PTBT”), 
which was later opened for signature by other states.197 As its name im-
plied, the PTBT limited its signatories to underground testing, which 
continued apace into the 1990s as the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Britain, and later France and China proceeded to develop, test, and 
modernize their nuclear arsenals.198 
 Complementing this nuclear testing regime, the United States and 
the Soviet Union engaged in a second series of mostly bilateral arms 
control agreements, including most notably the 1972 Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (“SALT I”)199 and Anti-Ballistic Missile (“ABM”) Trea-
ty200; the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty  (“SALT II”) (never rati-
fied by the United States, but honored in practice by both sides)201; the 
                                                                                                                      
 
195 See generally Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14.2 U.S.T. 1963 [hereinafter PTBT]. 
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art. 1. 
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199 SALT I, supra note 196. 
200 ABM, supra note 196. 
201 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, 18 
I.L.M. 1138 [hereinafter SALT II]; Christopher A. Ford, Debating Disarmament: Interpreting 
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 14 Nonproliferation Rev. 
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1987 plurilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (“INF”) Treaty202; 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, START I203 and START II204, in 
1991 and 1993 respectively; and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty (“SORT”), also known as the Moscow Treaty.205 In April 2010, 
U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
signed the “New START,” a treaty which will further reduce limits on 
U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, requiring both sides to limit their 
nuclear arsenals to 1550 warheads each; this new treaty was ratified by 
the U.S. Senate in December 2010, and by the Russian Duma in January 
2011.206 Through this gradual process, accelerating after the end of the 
Cold War, the two largest nuclear powers have accepted significant hard-
law limitations on the numbers and types of weapons deployed.207 Yet 
none of these agreements called into question the fundamental right of 
each state to possess and deploy nuclear weapons, to threaten their use 
as part of a policy of deterrence, or, ultimately, to use them in self-
defense.208 
 Finally, a third leg of the nuclear weapons regime was constituted 
by the multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NPT”).209 The 
Treaty, which was opened for signature in 1968 and later extended for 
an indefinite period at a 1995 review conference, was originally con-
ceived as a grand bargain between the officially recognized nuclear 
                                                                                                                      
401, 415 (2007) (noting that although SALT II was never ratified for political reasons, the 
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202 Treaty on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 
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Start Treaty, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www. 
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207 See supra notes 197–205 and accompanying text. 
208 Cf. supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
209 See generally Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signa-
ture July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. 
1184 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1147 
weapon states (“NWS” —originally the United States, the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain, later joined by France and China) on the one hand, 
and the much larger group of nonnuclear weapon states (“NNWS”) on 
the other.210 According to the terms of the treaty, nonnuclear weapon 
states agree not to receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons211 
and also to accept safeguards and verification inspections conducted by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) to confirm that nu-
clear technology is not diverted from peaceful energy use to weapons 
manufacturing.212 Although many critics have interpreted these provi-
sions as cementing “second-class” status for NNWS, these states gain the 
benefits of preventing nuclear proliferation to potential rivals, as well as 
a recognized “inalienable right” to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
and a series of treaty-based concessions by the NWS.213 
 For their part, the United States and other nuclear weapon states 
agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or to otherwise assist any NNWS 
in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.214 Just as importantly, nu-
clear weapon states accept certain responsibilities toward non-nuclear 
weapon states, including assisting NNWS in developing their peaceful 
nuclear industries.215 Perhaps most significantly for our purposes, Arti-
cle VI of the treaty imposes obligations on all states-parties to the treaty, 
including nuclear weapon states, “to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control.”216 These latter provisions constitute hard law in terms of obli-
gation through their placement in a legally binding treaty with 189 
states-parties, yet unlike the provisions applying to non-nuclear weap-
ons states’ policies and inspections, Article VI in particular lacks both 
precision (the parties are required to negotiate “in good faith,” but not 
to reach any specific outcome by any specific date) and third-party dis-
pute resolution.217 The interpretation of Article VI, and the obligations 
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that it imposes on recognized nuclear-weapon states, would be the sub-
ject of significant dispute in the coming years.218 
 For the first three decades following the Second World War, these 
regimes placed modest restrictions on the nuclear powers with respect 
to nuclear testing, deployment of certain types of weapons, and prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. Significantly, 
moreover, most of these treaties were legally binding, hard-law agree-
ments—often very precise, and with some degree of third-party delega-
tion to the IAEA in particular. Yet, reflecting the interests of the nuclear 
powers, who were also the five permanent members of the Security 
Council and who took the lead in drafting these treaties, none of these 
treaties called into question the fundamental right of these states to possess, 
threaten, or even ultimately use nuclear weapons in self-defense. The most far-
reaching provisions that might question the legality of nuclear weapons 
could be found in Article VI of the NPT regarding disarmament nego-
tiations among the extant nuclear powers, yet these provisions were also 
among the “softest” or least precise, stating a general goal of nuclear 
disarmament but imposing no concrete obligations or timelines on the 
nuclear powers. 
B. Challenges to the Legality of Nuclear Weapons 
 From the 1960s through the 1990s, a sizable coalition of states cor-
responding roughly with the Non-Aligned Movement (“NAM”), joined 
by a growing number of anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), sought to challenge the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons by the nuclear powers.219 These actors pointed to the enor-
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mous destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the growing number of 
such weapons, the inequity built into the NPT regime with its two 
classes of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and, above all, the 
failure of the nuclear weapon states to make progress toward compre-
hensive nuclear disarmament as called for in Article VI of the NPT. 
Unable, however, to secure changes to the NPT or to other binding 
arms-control treaties governing the use of nuclear weapons, these states 
concentrated much of their effort on another forum, a soft-law forum: 
the General Assembly of the United Nations.220 
 In a series of deeply disputed resolutions, often introduced and 
supported largely by members of the NAM, the General Assembly re-
peatedly declared the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons to be 
contrary to the principles of the UN Charter and of international hu-
manitarian law.221 The first of these declarations, General Assembly 
Resolution 1653, was adopted in 1961, and declared that “[t]he use of 
nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and 
aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Char-
ter of the United Nations.”222 The heyday of anti-nuclear resolutions in 
the General Assembly, however, began in the late 1970s, corresponding 
to the ascendance of the newly independent, less-developed countries 
(“LDCs”).223 These states generally caucused in the context of the NAM 
for the purposes of international security and other matters. During 
this period, LDCs were regularly able to summon lopsided majorities 
critical of the United States and other advanced industrialized coun-
tries, calling both for a “New International Economic Order” and for a 
new security order in which the recognized nuclear powers would more 
vigorously pursue the NPT provisions relating to nuclear disarmament 
as well as the transfer of civilian nuclear technology.224 
 The first of these resolutions, which were to pass regularly through 
the General Assembly from the late 1970s to the present, was adopted 
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in December 1978 over the opposition or abstention of the United 
States, its allies, and the other nuclear powers.225 The resolution de-
clared unequivocally that: (1) the use of nuclear weapons will be a vio-
lation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity and (2) the use 
of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear 
disarmament.226 
 Subsequent resolutions introduced by the Non-Aligned Movement 
sought further to criminalize the use of nuclear weapons, in a series of 
stages. Following nearly identical resolutions in 1979227 and 1980228 de-
claring the threat of use of nuclear weapons to be illegal, the General 
Assembly in 1981 urged “consideration . . . of an international conven-
tion on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 
or some other agreement on the subject.”229 This call for a hard-law 
instrument outlawing the threat or use of nuclear weapons became far 
more specific in 1990, when the NAM, encouraged and aided by a 
growing coalition of “abolitionist” NGOs, secured the adoption of a 
new Resolution 45/59B, reiterating the (soft-law) claim that use of nu-
clear weapons constituted a crime against humanity, and calling explic-
itly for a hard-law “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nu-
clear Weapons.”230 The annex to the resolution contained a brief, four-
article draft convention, the first article of which stated that, “The 
States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.”231 The 
resolution was adopted by a vote of 125 mostly less-developed countries 
in favor, with seventeen states opposed and ten abstentions primarily 
from the ranks of the nuclear powers and military allies of the United 
States.232 This resolution was again followed by similar General Assem-
bly resolutions in the following years, reiterating the demand for a con-
vention outlawing nuclear weapons and regretting the unwillingness of 
nuclear weapons states to engage in such negotiations.233 
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C. The ICJ Nuclear Weapons Case 
 In the mid-1990s, spurred by a coalition of anti-nuclear NGOs co-
operating under the rubric of the World Court Project, opponents of 
nuclear weapons undertook efforts in yet another legal avenue, en-
couraging majorities in both the General Assembly and the Assembly of 
the World Health Organization (WHO) to request an opinion from the 
International Court of Justice regarding the legality of nuclear weap-
ons.234 Both requests were submitted pursuant to Article 96 of the UN 
Charter, which authorizes both the Security Council and the General 
Assembly to request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question, while other UN organs and specialized agencies may request 
advisory opinions on legal questions “arising within the scope of their 
activities.”235 Requests for advisory opinions of the ICJ had been made 
sparingly prior to the two nuclear weapons cases, and typically on rela-
tively narrow issues of law arising in the context of the activities of a UN 
organ.236 The WHO and General Assembly requests for opinions were 
therefore controversial among the member governments of the two 
bodies,237 as well as in the legal community.238 In the case of the WHO 
request, the Court controversially decided, by eleven to three votes, to 
decline the WHO request for an advisory opinion, ruling that the 
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WHO request did not relate to an issue within the scope of the WHO’s 
activities.239 
 The UN General Assembly made the second, and successful, re-
quest for an ICJ opinion. On December 15, 1994, the General Assembly 
adopted—by a vote of seventy-eight in favor to forty-three against and 
with thirty-eight abstaining—a resolution requesting an advisory opin-
ion from the International Court of Justice on the following question: 
“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted 
under international law?”240 The case became one of the most bitterly 
contested decisions in the history of the ICJ, with twenty-eight states 
filing written statements and twenty-two states taking part in oral pro-
ceedings before the court.241 The United States, other nuclear weapon 
states, and U.S. allies, furthermore, raised jurisdictional objections to 
the General Assembly request, urging the ICJ to rule that it lacked ju-
risdiction to hear the case, or that it should use its discretion not to give 
an opinion.242 The ICJ, however, rejected these arguments by a vote of 
                                                                                                                      
 
239 See id. at 56. The minimum jurisdictional requirements for advisory opinions under 
the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute are three-fold: (1) a legal question; (2) a proper re-
questing body; and (3) in the case of an authorized organ or specialized agency, a legal 
question “within the scope of its activities.” Id. In the case of the WHO request, the Court 
ruled that although the first two criteria were met, the third was not. See Michael Bothe, 
The WHO Request, in International Law, the International Court of Justice, supra 
note 219, at 103, 103–04. For good discussions of the WHO request, the ICJ’s opinion, and 
the dissenting and separate opinions of three of the judges, see Nanda & Krieger, supra 
note 194, at 87–104; Bothe, supra, at 103–11; and Virginia Leary, The WHO Case: Implica-
tions for Specialized Agencies, in International Law, the International Court of Jus-
tice, supra note 219, at 112, 112–27. 
240 G.A. Res. 49/75K, ¶¶ 15–16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75K (Dec. 15, 1994); U.N. 
GAOR, 49th Sess., 90th mtg. at 35–36, U.N. Doc. A/49/PV.90 (Dec. 14, 1994). 
241 Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 106. 
242 See, e.g., Letter Dated 20 June 1995 from the Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of State, 
Together with Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America, Int’l Court of 
Justice 14 ( June 20, 1995), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8700.pdf [hereinafter 
U.S. Letter of June 20, 1995] (filed in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons); 
Letter Dated 16 June 1995 from the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Together with Written Comments of the 
United Kingdom, Int’l Court of Justice ¶¶ 2.25–.27 ( June 16, 1995), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/8802.pdf [hereinafter U.K. Letter of June 16, 1995] (filed in Le-
gality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons). On the merits, the United States main-
tained: 
On the contrary, the possible use of these weapons is an important factor in 
the structure of their [the Permanent Members of the Security Council’s] 
military establishments, the development of their security doctrines and strat-
egy, and their efforts to prevent aggression and provide an essential element 
of the exercise of their right of self-defense. 
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13–1, ruling that the General Assembly request did indeed raise a “legal 
question,” and that it had the right to request an opinion under Article 
96 of the UN Charter.243 The Court also rejected arguments, raised by 
the United States and its allies, that the request was unacceptably vague 
and abstract, that an opinion would adversely affect disarmament nego-
tiations and that in offering its opinion the court would go beyond its 
judicial function and assert a lawmaking role.244 
 The ICJ’s opinion in response to the General Assembly request was 
one of the most complex and carefully scrutinized in the history of the 
court, and can be analyzed only briefly here.245 The court’s forty-two 
page opinion was equivocal on the central question of the legality of 
nuclear weapons.246 After one of the court’s members died during the 
proceedings, the court’s central finding was decided by a 7–7 vote, with 
the court President’s affirmative vote breaking the tie.247 The decision 
itself was followed by 307 pages of separate and dissenting opinions by 
all fourteen of the judges in the case.248 
                                                                                                                      
 
See U.S. Letter of June 20, 1995, at 14. Similarly, the United Kingdom maintained on the 
merits that 
[i]n any event, there is no incompatibility between the two propositions (i) 
that States do not have an unlimited choice of the methods and means of 
warfare and (ii) that States may use nuclear weapons where this is consistent 
with their right of self-defence. There is no suggestion that self-defence is 
“unlimited”. 
See U.K. Letter of June 16, 1995, ¶ 3.56. 
243 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 12 ( July 8). 
244 Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 106–11. 
245 See, e.g., Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 110–47; Hugh Thirlway, The Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinions: The Declarations and Separate and Dissenting Opinions, in Interna-
tional Law, the International Court of Justice, supra note 219, at 390, 390–434 (pro-
viding a thorough analysis of the various separate and dissenting opinions in the case). 
246 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
¶ 105 (2)(E) ( July 8). 
247 Id.; see Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 88. Judge Mawdsley of Venezuela, one 
of the court’s fifteen judges, died just prior to oral testimony in the two cases, leaving four-
teen judges to render opinions. Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 88. 
248 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226 ( July 8). One interesting question is whether the ICJ judges were systematically biased 
in favor of the states that appointed them or—as would seem relevant in this case—biased 
in terms of their own states’ status as a nuclear or nonnuclear weapon state or as an ally of 
the United States or the Soviet Union. See Eric A. Posner & Michael F.P. de Figueiredo, Is 
the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. Leg. Stud. 599, 600–02 (2005). In this context, 
it is striking that the three judges from the United States, Britain, and France (Schwebel, 
Higgins, and Guillaume, respectively) adopted dissenting or separate opinions, arguing for 
the legality of nuclear weapons, and that the three strongest dissents opposing legality 
came from judges native to countries in the NAM ( Judge Weeramantry of Sri Lanka, Judge 
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 In its opinion, the court first asked whether there existed any spe-
cific authorization or comprehensive prohibition of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons in international law. The judges unanimously ruled 
that neither customary nor treaty law specifically authorized the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons. But the question of whether the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons is prohibited was more difficult. Crucially for our 
purposes, the court examined the long stream of General Assembly 
resolutions reviewed above, most of which had asserted explicitly that 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal under international law 
and indeed constituted a crime against humanity. If the court had 
found that these resolutions constituted customary international law, 
then the Non-Aligned Movement’s strategic use of soft law could have 
legally bound the nuclear powers to a policy of non-use. The court 
pointed to a state practice of non-use, noting that nuclear weapons had 
not been used in combat since 1945, but ultimately rejected the argu-
ment of some states that the various General Assembly resolutions con-
stituted opinio juris: 
Examined in their totality, the General Assembly resolutions 
put before the Court declare that the use of nuclear weapons 
would be “a direct violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions”; and in certain formulations that such use “should be 
prohibited[.]” . . . [H]owever, several of the resolutions under 
consideration in the present case have been adopted with 
substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions; thus, 
although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern 
regarding the problem of nuclear weapons, they still fall short 
of establishing the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality 
of the use of such weapons.249 
The court therefore ruled by an 11–3 vote, in paragraph 105 (2)B of its 
opinion, that “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional inter-
national law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons as such.”250 
                                                                                                                      
 
Shahabuddeen of Guyana, and Judge Koroma of Sierra Leone, all of whom offered dis-
sents asserting the illegality of nuclear threat or use). See Nanda & Krieger, supra note 
194, at 122–47; Thirlway, supra note 245, at 390–434. 
249 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 71 ( July 8); see also Roger S. Clark, Treaty and Custom, in International Law, the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 219, at 171, 171–80 (examining the Court’s 
treatment of customary international law). 
250 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 105(2)(B) ( July 8). Three judges—Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, and Koroma—
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 Having ruled that existing international law neither directly au-
thorized nor prohibited the use of nuclear weapons per se, the court 
turned to analyzing the consistency of nuclear threat or use with other 
bodies of law, including human rights law, environmental law, the law 
of neutrality, and humanitarian law. Despite efforts by some nonnu-
clear weapons states to apply human rights law and environmental law 
to the question of nuclear weapons, the court adopted a narrower ap-
proach (lex specialis), focusing primarily on the application of interna-
tional law relating to the use of force.251 Paragraphs 105 (2)C and (2)D, 
in this context, asserted that any use of nuclear weapons would have to 
conform with articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter (the latter regard-
ing the use of armed force in self-defense) and with international hu-
manitarian law.252 
 Having concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons must 
conform to international humanitarian law, the ICJ was equally divided, 
in paragraph 105 (2)E, as to whether the threat or use of nuclear wea-
pons could be justified “in any circumstance” under international 
law.253 The court noted the views expressed by certain states, which ar-
gued that 
recourse to nuclear weapons could never be compatible with 
the principles and rules of humanitarian law and is therefore 
prohibited. In the event of their use, nuclear weapons would 
in all circumstances be unable to draw any distinction be-
tween the civilian population and combatants, . . . and their 
effects, largely uncontrollable, could not be restricted, either 
in time or space, to lawful military targets. Such weapons 
would kill and destroy in a necessarily indiscriminate manner, 
on account of the blast, heat and radiation occasioned by the 
nuclear explosion and the effects induced; and the number of 
casualties which would ensue would be enormous. The use of 
nuclear weapons would therefore be prohibited in any cir-
                                                                                                                      
dissented from this view, arguing that a general prohibition on nuclear use could be found 
in the corpus of international humanitarian law. See Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 
123–32. 
251 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 105(2)(C)-(D) ( July 8). 
252 See id.; U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 4, 51. 
253 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 105(2)(E) ( July 8). 
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cumstance, notwithstanding the absence of any explicit con-
ventional prohibition.254 
“Nevertheless,” the opinion continued, “the Court considers that it 
does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty 
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with 
the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any cir-
cumstance.”255 
 The result of this reasoning was the court’s widely cited paragraph 
105 (2)E, decided by a vote of 7–7 with President Bedjaoui casting the 
deciding vote, in which the court found that 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be con-
trary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humani-
tarian law; 
 However, in view of the current state of international law, 
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot 
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circum-
stance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State 
would be at stake.256 
In effect, the ICJ came very close to the position of abolitionist NGOs 
and the NAM, holding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
“generally” be contrary to established humanitarian law, yet the court 
refused to rule out the legality of such threat or use in “extreme cir-
cumstances of self-defense,” and thus left an opening for the nuclear 
powers.257 Finally, in paragraph 2(F), agreed upon unanimously, the 
court reaffirmed the basic principles of Article VI of the NPT, ruling 
that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a 
                                                                                                                      
254 Id. ¶ 92. 
255 Id. ¶ 95. 
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257 See id. On the court’s findings in this paragraph, see, e.g., Nanda & Krieger, supra 
note 194, at 114, 120–22; Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of International 
Law, in International Law, the International Court of Justice, supra note 219, at 
153–70; Marcelo G. Kohen, The Notion of ‘State Survival’ in International Law, in Interna-
tional Law, the International Court of Justice, supra note 219, at 293–314; and Ma-
theson, supra note 234, at 427–34. Among the dissenting votes, three of the judges 
(Schwebel, Higgens, and Guillaume) argued explicitly for legality, while three others 
(Weeramantry, Shahabuddeen, and Koroma) argued for illegality in all circumstances. See 
Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 122–45. 
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conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its as-
pects under strict and effective international control.”258 
D. The Struggle Continues 
 Given the equivocal nature of the decision and the proliferation of 
dissents and separate opinions by the judges, the decision was a legal 
“Rorschach test,” open to multiple interpretations.259 Among the nu-
clear powers, the United States, Britain, France, and Russia all inter-
preted the decision as allowing the threat and use of nuclear weapons in 
the cause of self-defense, and as consistent with their ongoing policy of 
nuclear deterrence. In its statement on the decision, for example, the 
U.S. government noted explicitly that “[w]e do not believe that the 
[c]ourt’s opinions provide reasons to alter the common defense policy 
of the United States and its allies” and Britain and France issued similar 
statements.260 Just as importantly for our purposes here, the United 
States and several of its allies noted that the court’s advisory opinion was 
not legally binding on UN member states—hence a soft-law rather than 
a hard-law decision.261 In sum, for nuclear weapons states, the ICJ ruling 
                                                                                                                      
258 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 105(2)(F) ( July 8); NPT, supra note 209, art. VI. 
259 See Paul Szasz, Book Review, 9 Rev. Eur. Comm. & Int’l Envtl. L. 83, 83 (2000) (re-
viewing International Law, the International Court of Justice, supra note 219). For 
a diverse set of scholarly responses, see, e.g., David Kennedy, The Nuclear Weapons Case, in 
International Law, the International Court of Justice, supra note 219, at 462, 462–
72; Martti Koskenniemi, The Silence of Law/The Voice of Justice, in International Law, the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 219, at 488, 488–510; and W. Michael Reis-
man, The Political Consequences of the General Assembly Advisory Opinion, in International 
Law, the International Court of Justice, supra note 219, at 473, 473–87. 
260 Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 155 (quoting U.S. statement); see id. at 153–58 
(reviewing the responses of the declared nuclear weapons states). 
261 See id. at 153–58. The United States asserted that “[t]hese are advisory opinions of 
the Court. Advisory opinions state the Court’s views on legal questions asked by interna-
tional organizations. They are not binding on governments.” Nanda & Krieger, supra 
note 194, at 155 (quoting the United States in reaction to Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons). Great Britain’s Attorney General, Sir Nicholas Lyell, similarly noted 
that “[t]he International Court’s Opinion is a response to a request from the UN General 
Assembly for advice, and is not a legally binding document,” while the French response to 
the decision was that “[t]hese opinions, which are not acts of jurisprudence, have no com-
pulsory force.” Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 155–56. The Russian position was 
similar to that of the British and French. China took a more conciliatory tone, noting that 
it had declared that it would “never be the first to use nuclear weapons” and that China 
had “undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear states or nuclear weapon-free zones.” Id. Even the Chinese position, however, 
did not abjure the possible threat or use of nuclear weapons in a second strike. See id. at 
157–58. 
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retained some room for the threat and potential use of nuclear weapons 
for deterrence, and in any event imposed no legally binding, hard-law 
obligations on UN member states to undertake nuclear disarmament. 
 By contrast with these positions, nonnuclear states and anti-nuclear 
NGOs emphasized the court’s statement about the “general” illegality of 
nuclear weapons, as well as the obligations of nuclear powers to engage 
in good-faith disarmament negotiations.262 After the ICJ judgment as 
before it, the nonnuclear states continued their effort to create new le-
gal norms and rules outlawing the threat or use of nuclear weapons.263 
Once again, these states and their NGO allies actively sought to en-
trench these rules in hard-law treaties or conventions, settling for soft-
law resolutions when hard-law provisions were blocked by nuclear pow-
ers and their allies.264 Hence, soon after the ICJ issued its opinion in July 
1996, Malaysia introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly, 
adopted in December of that year.265 The decision took note of the ICJ 
ruling and underlined “the unanimous conclusion of the [c]ourt that 
there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclu-
sion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.”266 
The resolution also revived the prospect of a binding convention, 
Call[ing] upon all States to fulfill that obligation immediately 
by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to 
an early conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention prohibit-
ing the development, production, testing, deployment, stock-
piling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and provid-
ing for their elimination.267 
As in the past, the General Assembly was sharply divided on the resolu-
tion, which was adopted by a vote of 115 in favor, with twenty-two op-
posed and thirty-two abstentions.268 
 The following year, in April 1997, anti-nuclear NGOs brought to-
gether a group of lawyers, scientists, diplomats and disarmament ex-
perts to draft a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (“NWC”), de-
signed to demonstrate the feasibility of such an instrument and to serve 
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NGOs, and the World Court Project). 
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266 Id.; see also Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 158–59. 
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as the basis for an eventual negotiation.269 The model convention 
would—if adopted—be a hard-law agreement prohibiting the use, 
threat of use, possession, development, testing, deployment, and trans-
fer of nuclear weapons, and providing a phased program for their eli-
mination.270 It would also provide for verification procedures and cre-
ate a standing secretariat to oversee them.271 Costa Rica formally intro-
duced the draft NWC as a document for discussion in the General 
Assembly later that year.272 
 As the vote on the December 1996 resolution indicates, however, 
the ICJ decision had essentially left the fault lines in the General As-
sembly unaffected, with most of the nonnuclear allies of the United 
States joining the established nuclear powers in opposing any effort to 
declare nuclear threat or use illegal, as well as opposing the opening of 
any negotiations on the proposed NWC.273 Instead, the ensuing decade 
witnessed a continuation of the long-standing struggle between the two 
sides, with the Non-Aligned Movement and its allies continuing their 
call to outlaw or criminalize the threat or use of nuclear weapons and 
to press the nuclear powers to pursue comprehensive nuclear disar-
mament pursuant to Article VI of the NPT.274 These efforts can be illus-
trated through a brief discussion of three sets of negotiations: (1) the 
hard-fought 1995 extension of the NPT and the subsequent review con-
ferences in 2000 and 2005, (2) the negotiation of the Treaty establish-
ing the International Criminal Court, and (3) the debate and adoption 
of resolutions in the UN General Assembly, which remains engaged. 
 With regard to the first of these negotiations, the United States and 
many of its allies were forced to engage in a protracted and often bitter 
struggle to secure the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation 
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273 See G.A. Res. 51/45M, ¶¶ 3–6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/45 M (Dec. 10, 1996); Nanda 
& Krieger, supra note 194, at 183–84. 
274 Nanda & Krieger, supra note 194, at 158–68. 
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Treaty in 1995.275 The NPT entered into force in 1970, and was sched-
uled for a review in 1995, at which point a majority of the signatories 
could choose to let the treaty lapse, renew it for a fixed period of time 
(such as ten or twenty-five years), or renew the treaty indefinitely.276 The 
United States, then under the Clinton Administration, took the lead in 
campaigning for an unconditional and indefinite extension of the trea-
ty, with strong support from Great Britain, France, and Russia.277 
 Not surprisingly, a number of non-nuclear weapon states, drawn 
largely from the ranks of the Non-Aligned Movement, sought to use the 
leverage of the 1995 extension decision to force concessions from the 
United States and the other nuclear powers.278 Specifically, countries 
such as Indonesia, Egypt, Mexico, Venezuela, North Korea, and Iran all 
initially opposed an indefinite extension, seeking instead to make any 
extension conditional on various concessions by the nuclear powers. 
Indonesian Ambassador Makarim Wibisono summarized this view, argu-
ing that “[a]lthough a quarter century has elapsed since the treaty came 
into force, no serious efforts have been made . . . to attain the [disar-
mament] objectives that were clearly stipulated” in the NPT.279 Hence, 
                                                                                                                      
 
275 For excellent overviews of the 1995 NPT extension negotiations, see Jayantha 
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279 Smith & Ottaway, supra note 278, at A4 (alterations in original). 
As a result, key developing nations want to link the NPT’s extension to spe-
cific new steps by the nuclear powers toward disarmament. While they have 
yet to agree on a specific proposal, their overall strategy is to exert leverage 
on the nuclear powers by extending the treaty only for a limited period, or a 
series of periods. That would deliberately create uncertainty about whether 
the treaty was permanent, leaving open the possibility that Third World na-
tions would obtain nuclear weapons in the future. 
Id. Miguel Marin-Bosch, Mexico’s chief representative at the talks, took a similarly hard-
line position throughout most of the negotiations, arguing of the nuclear powers that 
“[t]hey continue to rely on nuclear weapons and do not seem prepared to give them up 
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Indonesia, Mexico, and other countries issued a series of demands for 
the nuclear powers to engage in specific commitments on nuclear dis-
armament, including most notably the conclusion of a Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”), a ban on the production of fissionable mate-
rials for nuclear weapons, security guarantees from nuclear powers to 
nonnuclear states, and the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone 
in Southeast Asia.280 Egypt, together with other Arab states, focused on 
the fact that Israel, a de facto nuclear power, was not a signatory of the 
NPT, and urged the United States to put pressure on Israel to accede to 
the treaty.281 Iran, under U.S. sanctions and accused by the United 
States of attempting to develop nuclear weapons technology, sought 
commitments on the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology.282 On the 
eve of the final conference, eleven NAM members, including Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and North Korea, sponsored a resolution calling for 
a twenty-five-year extension, with further extensions to occur automati-
cally unless a majority of states-parties were opposed.283 
 The Clinton Administration, supported by Britain, France, Russia, 
Japan, and all the members of the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (“OSCE”), sought an unconditional and indefinite 
extension of the treaty, and engaged in a months-long lobbying effort 
to win over votes from the rest of the NPT membership.284 Facing a di-
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vided Non-Aligned Movement with diverse preferences, the United 
States used both carrots and sticks in its campaign, putting intense 
pressure on a number of governments while offering compromises on 
specific issues.285 In the end, the conference adopted a resolution, 
based on a South African compromise proposal, that extended the 
NPT indefinitely and unconditionally, with only non-binding language 
regarding the principles and review procedures for future disarmament 
negotiations by nuclear weapon states. The five nuclear powers agreed 
to make “systematic and progressive efforts” to reduce nuclear stock-
piles, and agreed to the “immediate commencement and early conclu-
sion” of a convention to halt the production of fissile material used to 
make bombs, as well as of the pending CTBT. Yet these provisions, like 
Article VI of the NPT, were vague, and included no substantive obliga-
tions or calendar for completion. Eight delegations reportedly spoke 
against the compromise (Syria, Jordan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Malay-
sia, and Nigeria), but did not object when the conference president, 
Jayantha Dhanpala of Sri Lanka, declared a consensus in favor of ex-
tension.286 The result was a decision that took symbolic note of the con-
cerns of the NAM states and abolitionist NGOs, but was substantively 
very close to the priorities of the United States and other nuclear wea-
pon states. 
 The same basic themes ran through the negotiation of the 1996 
CTBT and the 2000 and 2005 NPT review conferences.287 As promised 
                                                                                                                      
the NAM, however, China continued to test nuclear weapons in 1995, and conducted a 
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unable to agree on a final declaration characterizing progress in nuclear disarmament since 
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during the 1995 NPT review conference, the CTBT was agreed to and 
opened for signature in September 1996, following the declaration of 
unilateral testing moratoria by each of the five official nuclear weapon 
states.288 Yet the Treaty had not come into force as of February 2010, 
pending ratification by two of the official nuclear-weapon states (United 
States and China) and four de facto nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, 
Israel, and North Korea).289 
 In the next two NPT review conferences, the central debates were 
similar, although the outcomes were very different. This owed in large 
part to the transition from the Clinton to the Bush Administration in 
the United States. In the 2000 conference, the NAM states pressed for, 
and the nuclear-weapon states accepted, far-reaching although non-
binding language on nuclear disarmament, including a planned series 
of “13 Practical Steps” such as the ratification of the CTBT, a morato-
rium on testing pending such ratification, adoption of a new treaty 
banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and an 
irreversible shift of national and alliance defense doctrines away from 
reliance on nuclear weapons (the principle of “irreversibility”).290 This 
declaration, although it imposed no substantive hard-law requirements 
on NWCs, was sufficient to gain widespread support in the confer-
ence.291 
 By 2005, however, the context had changed dramatically, with 
growing concern about the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT (in 
2003) and about nuclear terrorism, which had been a marginal issue 
five years earlier. Just as significantly, the Bush Administration brought 
a new set of policy priorities to the NPT negotiations, focusing its atten-
tion on North Korea and Iran and strongly resisting arms-control de-
mands such as the U.S. ratification of the CTBT, the negotiation of a 
verifiable ban on production of fissile materials for weapons use, or any 
change in U.S. defense doctrine away from use of nuclear weapons.292 
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With the NAM states continuing to demand significant progress toward 
disarmament, the United States sought to omit any reference to the “13 
Steps” of the 2000 conference document, and the conference broke up 
amid recriminations with no substantive declaration of the parties.293 
Hence, while the NPT regime has been indefinitely extended, largely in 
favor of NWS interests, the basic principles of the regime—particularly 
those relating to nuclear use and disarmament—remain fundamentally 
contested to the present day.294 
 The issue of the legality of nuclear weapons also spilled over be-
yond the arms-control regime and into a second area, namely interna-
tional criminal law. In 1998, during the negotiation of the treaty estab-
lishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), a number of parties to 
the negotiations called for the use of nuclear weapons to be included in 
the list of war crimes over which the court would have jurisdiction.295 
Such a draft provision was formally introduced by India (a nuclear 
power but a non-signatory to the NPT) during the final negotiations, 
but was rejected when Norway, supported by Malawi and Chile, intro-
duced a “no-action” motion, which was adopted by a vote of 114 to six-
teen with twenty abstentions.296 Although a number of delegations in-
dicated their disappointment with the omission of nuclear use from the 
list of war crimes, most delegations reportedly feared that such a provi-
sion would doom the treaty and therefore backed the Norwegian mo-
tion.297 Although the United States would ultimately refuse to sign the 
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treaty, opposition from the United States and other nuclear and allied 
countries was effective in keeping the proposed provisions out of the 
hard-law ICC Treaty.298 
 Third and finally, the issue of the legality or illegality of nuclear 
weapons continues to bitterly divide the UN General Assembly and its 
First Committee on disarmament and international security, where the 
lines remain drawn almost exactly as they were before and immediately 
after the ICJ decision. In April 2007, nongovernmental organizations 
drafted a revised Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which was then 
submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia for discussion by the General As-
sembly.299 Later that year, in December 2007, the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 62/39, “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons.”300 Like its predecessors over the previous decade,301 the 
Resolution recalled the original ICJ decision, “underlin[ing] once again 
the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that 
there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclu-
sion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects un-
der strict and effective international control.”302 The Resolution pro-
ceeded to cite the 1995 NPT extension, the 1996 CTBT, and the “un-
equivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States [at the 2000 NPT 
review conference] to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear 
arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.”303 The resolution also ex-
pressed “regret” over the failure to reach agreement at the 2005 NPT 
review conference, and “deep concern” at the lack of progress in im-
plementing Article VI of the NPT. Furthermore, in language virtually 
identical to resolutions adopted a decade earlier, the Resolution: 
Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfill that obli-
gation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an 
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2011] Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security 1203 
early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting 
the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpil-
ing, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing 
for their elimination.304 
 The most striking evidence of continuity was the vote on the reso-
lution, which was adopted by 127 votes in favor, with twenty-seven op-
posed and twenty-seven abstentions.305 Support for UN resolutions 
condemning the threat or use of nuclear weapons remains widespread 
in the GA, particularly among nonnuclear states of the NAM (often 
supported by the official or de facto nuclear powers of China, India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea), which regularly summon upwards of 125 
votes for such resolutions. Opposition remained similarly constant and 
entrenched, and continues to be led by the United States, Britain, 
France, Russia, and most of the European countries.306 
E. Change with the Obama Administration? 
 In January 2009, the Obama administration took office in the 
United States, resulting in a change of tone and substance in U.S. nu-
clear policy, with a particularly strong focus on Obama’s long-standing 
concerns about nuclear nonproliferation and the security of nuclear 
materials, and a corresponding willingness by the President to reduce 
U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and engage in additional steps to-
wards nuclear arms control and disarmament. Following an April 2009 
speech in Prague envisioning a world without nuclear weapons,307 the 
new administration proceeded on multiple fronts, culminating in the 
so-called “nuclear spring” of 2010.308 In April 2010, the administration 
released a revised “Nuclear Posture Review,” reducing reliance on nu-
clear weapons in U.S. military strategy and pledging not to use nuclear 
weapons against any nonnuclear state in compliance with the NPT.309 
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Two days later, the United States and the Russian Federation signed the 
New START treaty, replacing both the previous START treaty, which 
had expired in December 2009, and the SORT treaty, and further re-
ducing the size of the U.S. and Russian active nuclear arsenals to 1550 
warheads.310 Also in April 2010, with great fanfare, the administration 
hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in which some forty-seven heads of 
state and government met to discuss the security of their nuclear stock-
piles and announce steps to prevent nuclear materials from falling into 
the hands of terrorists.311 
 Finally, on May 3, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led 
the U.S. Delegation at the opening of the 2010 NPT Review Confer-
ence, at which the administration sought support for a strengthening of 
the regime, including by promoting widespread acceptance of the Ad-
ditional Protocol on International Atomic Energy Agency inspections 
and by seeking diplomatic support for a new round of sanctions against 
Iran for failure to cooperate with IAEA inspectors.312 By contrast with 
the more hard-line approach of the Bush Administration, the Obama 
Administration sought to portray itself as serious about the disarma-
ment provisions of NPT, thereby increasing its credibility among non-
nuclear weapons states, in an effort to secure concessions on the non-
proliferation issues most important to the administration.313 Neverthe-
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less, despite the new tone of the Obama Administration and its com-
mitment to eventual nuclear disarmament, the administration also 
“made clear the United States will retain a nuclear deterrent for as long 
as nuclear weapons exist, one that can protect our country and our al-
lies,” and implicitly retained the option to use nuclear weapons against 
states outside or in contravention of the NPT—thereby reasserting the 
long-standing U.S. position on the U.S. legal right to use and to 
threaten to use nuclear weapons.314 Hence, notwithstanding the sub-
stantial change of tone and substance from the Bush to Obama admini-
strations on nuclear issues, the U.S. position on the central question of 
the legality of nuclear use remained similar to those of previous ad-
ministrations, and far removed from those of its critics. 
F. Hard and Soft Law Interaction and the Legalization of Nuclear Weapons 
 Although far removed in subject matter from the transatlantic 
economic disputes that we examined earlier, the ICJ/nuclear weapons 
case provides substantial support for our hypotheses. In this case, not-
withstanding the considerable tensions of the Cold War, the most pow-
erful countries of the world were largely in agreement that interna-
tional law, while regulating the acquisition, deployment, and testing of 
nuclear weapons, did not prohibit their use or threat of use.315 Consis-
tent with this view, the body of international law—and especially hard 
law—addressing nuclear weapons did not call into question the nuclear 
powers’ right to threaten or use these weapons. For the first several 
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decades of the post-war era, therefore, and consistent with Hypothesis 
1, hard and soft law were largely complementary on the question of the 
legality of nuclear weapons.316 
 Over the course of the 1970s, however, a coalition of smaller and 
weaker states led by the Non-Aligned Movement sought to challenge 
the legal order and understanding accepted by the coalition of the five 
original nuclear powers and their NATO allies.317 In these circum-
stances, and consistent with Hypothesis 3, dissatisfied states and their 
NGO allies sought both hard- and soft-law instruments to undermine 
powerful states’ interpretation of the NPT and other relevant treaties, 
declaring the threat and use of nuclear weapons to be illegal. Consis-
tent with Hypotheses 4, moreover, these states actively sought the adop-
tion of new hard-law treaties and conventions, including a draft Con-
vention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, a model 
Nuclear Weapons Convention, stronger restrictions on nuclear weap-
ons in the 1995 NPT extension and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, and a proposed criminalization of nuclear use in the ICC Trea-
ty.318 Given the strong negotiating position of the nuclear weapons 
states (including all of the P-5) and their allies, however, all of these 
efforts failed.319 
 Confronted with these obstacles to hard-law creation, the coalition 
of anti-nuclear states and NGOs concentrated their attention on avail-
able institutions that could develop soft law, where they could enjoy 
greater success.320 These institutions included the UN General Assem-
bly where they passed a series of soft-law resolutions over the objections 
of the nuclear powers.321 Through the General Assembly and the As-
sembly of the World Health Organization (where superior numbers 
again allowed them to outvote the nuclear weapons states and their al-
lies), this coalition of anti-nuclear states requested an advisory opinion 
(judicial, but non-compulsory) from the ICJ.322 Faced with the firm 
opposition of the nuclear weapon states and their allies, however, and 
consistent with Hypothesis 3, anti-nuclear states and NGOs enjoyed at 
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best limited success in their effort to change existing understandings of 
hard law.323 
 Finally, and again consistent with Hypothesis 3, the antagonistic 
interaction of hard- and soft-law provisions resulted in some softening of 
hard law regarding the legitimacy of the use and threat to use nuclear 
weapons, based on an ICJ decision that was vague, profoundly con-
tested, and whose legally binding character was explicitly denied by po-
werful nuclear states.324 It also gave rise to hard bargaining in soft-law 
fora, particularly in the General Assembly where soft-law resolutions 
were bitterly contested among the member states. To be sure, the sof-
tening of hard law in the ICJ nuclear weapons opinion was determined 
by multiple factors. The court was in a difficult position both legally (in-
terpreting and weighing contradictory provisions of multiple sources of 
both hard and soft law) and politically (coming between status-quo nu-
clear powers and a GA majority of challenging states and NGOs), and 
individual judges on the court appear to have argued in ways that were 
broadly consistent with the views of their country of origin.325 Neverthe-
less, the soft-law nature of the General Assembly challenge shaped the 
decision in distinctive ways, leading the judges to reject arguments from 
the anti-nuclear states about customary international law on the one 
hand, while seeking to validate concerns expressed in General Assembly 
resolutions on the other hand. 
 For our purposes, then, the lessons of the ICJ nuclear weapons 
dispute are clear. In this case, states and non-state actors used hard- and 
soft- law provisions as antagonists. As a result of the interaction of these 
instruments, hard law was arguably made less certain and less precise in 
light of the ICJ’s divided and vague decision. Moreover, soft lawmaking 
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fora involved few of the purported advantages of soft law, such as an 
enhancement of deliberation and the curtailment of hard bargaining, 
because of concerns over the implications for existing hard law. Less 
powerful states enjoyed at best partial success against the entrenched 
views of powerful nuclear weapon states. The legal outcome, far from 
being clarified and progressively developed by the complementary in-
teraction of hard and soft law, remains deeply disputed and uncertain. 
III. Sovereignty, Intervention, and the Responsibility  
to Protect Doctrine 
 Our hypotheses about hard and soft law interaction are further 
supported by the example of the responsibility to protect doctrine. In 
September 2005, the member states of the United Nations, meeting at 
a special summit to commemorate the UN’s 60th anniversary, adopted 
by consensus a landmark declaration on “the responsibility to pro-
tect.”326 The responsibility to protect doctrine (or “R2P” as it is com-
monly abbreviated) has been variously defined over the years, but as 
the heads of state conceived it at the UN summit, the term indicated 
that every state government bore the primary responsibility for protect-
ing the well-being of its citizens, and that, should a particular state 
“manifestly fail[]” in its responsibility, the international community 
could step in to exercise its secondary responsibility, including if neces-
sary through military intervention.327 Over the previous decade, UN 
members, and in particular those in the Security Council, had con-
fronted a series of humanitarian crises, including in Haiti, Somalia, and 
the Balkans, and the Security Council had responded by authorizing a 
series of international interventions to protect individuals from massa-
cres or ethnic cleansing.328 Yet these authorizations had not addressed 
the apparent contradiction between the interventions and the Char-
ter’s bedrock principle of state sovereignty spelled out most clearly in 
Articles 2(4)329 and 2(7).330 Moreover, they did not provide a clear set 
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of principles or criteria governing the choice of whether and when to 
intervene. Remarkably, given its apparent contradiction or at least sig-
nificant qualification of the language of sovereignty in the Charter, the 
soft-law declaration on the responsibility to protect was adopted by con-
sensus among all UN members, apparently heralding a fundamental 
shift in one of the cornerstone governing principles of international 
law.331 
 The UN summit’s consensual endorsement of the responsibility to 
protect doctrine would seem at first glance to be very different in char-
acter from the bitterly disputed UN General Assembly resolutions on 
nuclear weapons, which were invariably adopted with large blocks of 
dissenting votes. Indeed, the endorsement of R2P by the UN member-
ship could appear at least initially to be a case of soft and hard law act-
ing as complements, with the soft-law R2P resolution elaborating and 
progressively developing the hard-law provisions of the Charter as well 
as legally binding resolutions of the Security Council over the previous 
decade.332 
 Looking more deeply into the development, declaration, and sub-
sequent implementation (or non-implementation) of the responsibility 
to protect, however, we argue that the real story of the R2P story is 
again one of antagonism, in two senses. First, notwithstanding the pro-
tests of R2P champions who argue that the responsibility to protect 
simply elaborates or progressively develops the Charter-based recogni-
tion of state sovereignty, the soft-law UN declaration—like other previ-
ous articulations of R2P in a series of commissioned reports—does in-
deed contradict (or, at a minimum, is in serious tension with) the plain 
language of Article 2(7) and other provisions of the UN Charter.333 
Second, the debate over R2P revealed a fundamental antagonism be-
tween two coalitions of states and non-state actors. One coalition, con-
sisting of mostly Western states, non-governmental organizations, and 
                                                                                                                      
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settle-
ment under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll. 
Id. 
331 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 326, ¶¶ 138–140. 
332 See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? 101 
Am. J. Int’l L. 99, 115–16 (2007) (conceptualizing the soft-law resolution in terms of the 
“progressive development of the law”). 
333 Chesterman, supra note 328, at 45–53 (analyzing the tension between R2P and Ar-
ticle 2(4)). 
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successive UN Secretaries-General, sought explicit and legally binding 
authorization for and criteria governing humanitarian intervention by 
the UN or by individual states or regional organizations. The other coa-
lition, consisting of Russia and China within the UN Security Council, 
supported by a large coalition of mostly nonaligned states in the Gen-
eral Assembly, sought to oppose or at least water down any language on 
R2P that would imply a weakening of state sovereignty and a right to 
intervene in their internal affairs. In other words, the soft-law provi-
sions on R2P and the hard-law Charter provisions on state sovereignty 
both acted as antagonists in legal terms, and were employed strategically as 
antagonists in political terms by states seeking to advance conflicting 
conceptions of intervention and state sovereignty. 
 This section reviews the legal and political history of the responsi-
bility to protect doctrine, showing how a coalition of mostly Western 
states such as Canada and the EU countries, as well as the UN Secre-
tary-General and humanitarian NGOs, formulated and elaborated the 
concept of the responsibility to protect in a series of soft-law docu-
ments, hoping to weaken the principle of absolute state sovereignty and 
to overcome resistance to humanitarian intervention in the UN Secu-
rity Council.334 The section begins with a brief review of the hard-law 
provisions of the Charter establishing a strong presumption in favor of 
state sovereignty and against intervention in the internal affairs of 
states, before examining a series of humanitarian interventions en-
dorsed during the course of the 1990s by the UN Security Council un-
der the rubric of threats to international peace and security. Through-
out this period, the decision to intervene was controversial, both within 
the legal community and among the member states in the Security 
Council. The Security Council’s Chapter VII resolutions during this 
period evaded the fundamental controversy by basing intervention de-
cisions on threats to international peace and security rather than hu-
man rights claims, even though observers recognized that it was human 
rights concerns that spurred the interventions.335 Fundamental divi-
sions on this issue, however, were brought out clearly in the 1999 de-
bate over Kosovo, when NATO countries intervened collectively in the 
                                                                                                                      
334 The United States’s position in this debate was complicated; it endorsed R2P as an 
enabling provision justifying U.S. intervention, but resisted any suggestion that the United 
States or the Security Council might be legally obligated to intervene militarily to protect 
individuals against their own states. See infra notes 414–415 and accompanying text. 
335 See Chesterman, supra note 328, at 121–62. 
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Yugoslav autonomous region without the authorization of a divided Se-
curity Council, prompting an ICJ legal challenge by Yugoslavia.336 
 The Kosovo intervention crystallized the debate over whether 
states could, individually or collectively, intervene legally for humanitar-
ian purposes without authorization from the UN Security Council. In 
the wake of the Kosovo case, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called 
for explicit criteria governing humanitarian intervention, leading to a 
series of soft-law reports by international committees and organizations 
calling explicitly for an internationally recognized responsibility to pro-
tect. We examine the adoption and language of these documents (re-
ports respectively of the International Committee on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty in 2001;337 the High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges, and Change in 2004;338 and the Secretary-General, entitled In 
Larger Freedom, in early 2005).339 Building from these reports, a coali-
tion of states and non-state actors pressed successfully for the endorse-
ment of R2P at the 2005 UN summit as a UN General Assembly Resolu-
tion.340 Yet the text of that Resolution differed in important ways from 
the original formulation, remaining silent on fundamental issues such 
as the criteria for intervention and the possibility of a state or coalition 
of states engaging in humanitarian intervention where the Security 
Council is deadlocked. Opponents of a strong right of humanitarian 
intervention succeeded in watering down the original language to a 
sort of R2P “lite” in the final declaration, and have since attempted to 
limit the impact of the doctrine in hard law and in practice. 
                                                                                                                      
336 See id. at 206–17. 
337 See generally Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsi-
bility to Protect (2001) [hereinafter ICISS], available at www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission 
Report.pdf. 
338 See generally Sec’y General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges & 
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) [hereinafter 
High-Level Panel Report], available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf. 
339 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom]. 
340 See generally 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 326. 
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A. The UN Charter and State Sovereignty 
 The issue of “humanitarian intervention” is not a new one.341 For 
centuries, states have undertaken military interventions in the internal 
affairs of other states for what they purport to be humanitarian reasons. 
Examples include 19th century European interventions in support of 
Christian communities under Muslim control in Greece and Syria, as 
well as the 1971 Indian invasion of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), 
the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the 1979 Tanzanian 
invasion of Uganda, although the invaders in the latter cases legally jus-
tified their invasions on the ground of self-defense as authorized under 
the UN Charter.342 From a legal perspective, these interventions have 
been deeply controversial, particularly in the post-1945 era when they 
appear to violate the black-letter law of Articles 2(4) and 2(7) and other 
provisions of the UN Charter. Although supporters of humanitarian 
intervention claim that humanitarian intervention should not be 
deemed contrary to Article 2(4) because it is not directed against a 
state’s territorial integrity or political sovereignty, the dominant attitude 
toward humanitarian intervention has been cautious, with many legal 
scholars fearing that any purported right of humanitarian intervention 
would undermine not only state sovereignty but also the tight restric-
tions on the use of force in the UN Charter, and thereby provide a pre-
text for self-interested interventions by powerful states.343 In practice, 
                                                                                                                      
341 The legal, political, and philosophical literature on humanitarian intervention is 
voluminous. Excellent introductions include Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: 
America and the Age of Genocide (2003); and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strang-
ers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 55–136 (2000) (writing 
from a constructivist/English school perspective of international relations regarding the 
construction and power of shared norms, including through international law). 
342 For a good discussion of the historical precedent for humanitarian intervention, 
see generally Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Inter-
vention (2008), which examines 19th century interventions on humanitarian grounds in 
Greece, Syria, Bulgaria, and Armenia. For a discussion of post-World War II interventions, 
see Wheeler, supra note 341, at 55–138, which examines the case studies of East Pakistan, 
Cambodia, and Uganda. 
343 See Chesterman, supra note 328, at 48–52 (providing an overview and assessment 
of the arguments made regarding the breadth of Article 2(4)’s “territorial integrity” 
prong); see also Michael Reisman with Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to 
Protect the Ibos, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 167, 177, 179 
n.42 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (stating that “[s]ince a humanitarian intervention seeks 
neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political independence of the State 
involved,” it is not precluded by Article 2(4)); Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic 
Invasion, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 645, 649 (1984) (maintaining that those who contend that a 
humanitarian war would not violate a country’s territorial integrity or political independ-
ence to require an “Orwellian construction” of these terms in the Charter). 
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for much of the UN’s history through the end of the Cold War, states 
occasionally claimed humanitarian motives for their military actions, 
but the UN Security Council, largely paralyzed by the U.S.-Soviet con-
flict, took no position on the question. 
 The end of the Cold War, however, brought with it a series of hu-
manitarian crises as well as a thawing of relations within the Security 
Council that brought the issue of humanitarian intervention to the fo-
refront of international relations and international law. During the 
1990s, beginning with the U.S.-led interventions to support of the Iraqi 
Kurds in 1991 and to restore order and provide humanitarian aid in 
Somalia in 1992, the Security Council authorized a series of military 
interventions in the internal affairs of various states, including in Haiti 
and in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia.344 
 Although the Security Council failed to act in the case of the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, it was to the shame of the UN and such failure 
strengthened calls for international intervention on humanitarian 
grounds.345 Advocates of this new doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion, such as Doctors Without Borders’ co-founder (and later French 
Foreign Minister) Bernard Kouchner, hailed these developments, pro-
claiming that the international community had a “right to intervene” — 
or in some cases a “duty to intervene” —to prevent large scale massacres 
and genocide.346 In effect, a soft and contested legal norm of humani-
tarian intervention appeared to be emerging, potentially challenging 
the existing hard-law prohibition on intervention in the UN Charter. 
 Within the Security Council, its members—and in particular the 
five permanent members: the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet 
Union (later Russia), and China—sought to sidestep this fundamental 
legal question in an effort to gain consensus for individual interven-
tions. In Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and other humanitarian cri-
ses, the Council members based their Chapter VII resolutions on pur-
ported threats to international peace and security—as, for example, 
from the international movement of refugees fleeing civil conflict— 
rather than on any purported right of humanitarian intervention.347 
                                                                                                                      
344 See Chesterman, supra note 328, at 130–55. 
345 See id. at 145. 
346 Bernard Kouchner, A Call for Humanitarian Intervention, Refugees, Dec. 1992, at 14, 
14–15 (advocating humanitarian intervention as a duty “wherever victims are calling out 
for help”); Bernard Kouchner, Establish a Right to Intervene Against War, Oppression, L.A. 
Times, Oct. 18, 1999, at B7; James Traub, A Statesman Without Borders, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 
2008 (Magazine), at 44, 50–51 (stating that Kouchner, who was foreign minister of France 
at the time, continues to advocate for intervention). 
347 See Chesterman, supra note 328, at 126–28. 
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During this period, lasting roughly from 1991 through early 1999, the 
Security Council acted on a case-by-case basis, authorizing timely and 
forceful interventions in some cases, and temporizing or failing to act 
at all in other cases (most dramatically and tragically with respect to the 
1994 Rwandan genocide).348 In each case it remained silent on the cen-
tral legal question of whether humanitarian intervention as such was 
justified by the terms of the UN Charter or other international legal 
provisions. 
 The weakness of this approach, and the fragility of the consensus 
in the Security Council of the 1990s, were revealed in early 1999, when 
the Yugoslav government of President Slobodan Milosevic, following 
the breakdown of diplomatic talks, began a campaign of reprisals and 
ethnic cleansing against ethnic Albanian insurgents and civilians in Ko-
sovo, which was then an autonomous province within the Republic of 
Serbia.349 Among the UN Security Council’s permanent members, the 
United States, Great Britain, and France all favored a military interven-
tion to prevent an impending humanitarian disaster and to enforce the 
provisions of previous Chapter VII resolutions. Faced, however, with 
fundamental opposition from Russia (which was broadly supportive of 
Milosevic’s Serbian nationalist position) and China (opposed, as always, 
to any undermining of the principle of sovereignty), these countries 
did not bring the issue to a vote in the UN Security Council, but instead 
chose to intervene through a regional organization, the NATO alli-
ance.350 On March 24, 1999, NATO forces began an aerial bombard-
ment of targets in Kosovo and Serbia, which continued for several 
months.351 Finally, in June, Milosevic’s government agreed to a peace 
agreement and a related Security Council resolution providing guaran-
tees to ethnic Albanians and providing for provisional UN control of 
the province as well as the presence of NATO peacekeepers.352 
 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, more than any other intervention 
over the previous decade, precipitated a fundamental debate over the 
                                                                                                                      
348 See id. at 145. 
349 Richard A. Falk, Editorial Comment, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of Interna-
tional Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 847, 847–57 (1999) (summarizing briefly the events in the 
former republic of Yugoslavia that prompted NATO intervention). 
350 Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, 
88 N.C. L. Rev. 1275, 1325 (2010) (explaining why NATO countries chose to avoid a Secu-
rity Council vote); Richard H. Pildes, Conflicts Between American and European Views of Law: 
The Dark Side of Legalism, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 145, 153 (2003) (noting opposition to UN inter-
vention from China, Russia, India, and Namibia). 
351 See Mohamed, supra note 350, at 1288 & n.36. 
352 See Chesterman, supra note 328, at 210–11. 
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legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in general, as well as over the 
legal right of a regional organization such as NATO to undertake a mil-
itary intervention in the absence of Security Council authorization. 
Critics of the intervention argued, among other matters, that humani-
tarian intervention was prohibited by Articles 2(4) and 2(7), and con-
tended further that only the Security Council, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, could legally order a military intervention.353 
Defenders of the NATO intervention, including the United States, oth-
er alliance members, as well as some legal scholars, made various ar-
guments in favor of its legality, pointing to the adoption of previous 
Security Council Resolutions ordering Yugoslavia to cease hostilities, to 
the emerging legal norm of humanitarian intervention, to the defense 
of fundamental legal principles (such as the prohibition against tor-
ture) that are jus cogens, and to the multilateral character of the NATO 
intervention (albeit in the absence of Security Council authoriza-
tion).354 These arguments were put forward not only in the debate 
                                                                                                                      
 
353 See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 
Am. J. Int’l L. 834, 834 (1999) (“Indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bomb-
ing campaign violated the United Nations Charter and international law.”); Christine M. 
Chinkin, Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War?, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 841, 842 (1999). 
But assertions of legality require a leap of faith. It does not need repeating 
that the international prohibition on the use of force is subject only to the 
right to self-defense (which was not in issue) and the primary (not exclusive) 
responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and security. 
Chinkin, supra, at 842; see also, e.g., Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian In-
tervention,” 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 824, 824 (1999) (“In my view, unilateral intervention, even 
for what the intervening state deems to be important humanitarian ends, is and should 
remain unlawful.”); Cases Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia, Belgium, Ger., 
It., Neth,. Port., Spain, U.K., U.S.), Oral Pleadings, 33–40 (May, 20 1999), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/105/4473.pdf (argument of Ian Brownlie). 
354 Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Para-
digm, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 597, 602 (2002); Paul R. Williams & Meghan E. Stewart, Humani-
tarian Intervention: The New Missing Link in the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity and 
Genocide?, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 97, 104 (2007) (stating that legal scholars argued that 
Security Council resolutions justified the Kosovo intervention). 
The legal justifications officially employed to legitimize the Kosovo interven-
tion centered on two main legal arguments: first, that previous UN Security 
Council resolutions could be construed to lend some authority to NATO’s ac-
tions; and, secondly, that principles of general international law provided for 
a right of intervention on the grounds of “overwhelming humanitarian ne-
cessity.” 
Joyner, supra, at 602; see also Thomas M. Franck, Humanitarian and Other Interventions, 43 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 321, 326–27 (2005) (stating that NATO acted to prevent impend-
ing genocide); Alain Pellet, Brief Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 
385, 387 (2000) (“As aptly noted by Ruth Wedgwood in a recent article, ‘A NATO decision 
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leading to the NATO intervention, but also in a series of subsequent 
Council debates and resolutions, including in response to a draft reso-
lution put forward by Russia on March 26, 1999 condemning the attack 
as a “threat to international peace” and a “flagrant violation” of the UN 
Charter.355 Significantly, this proposed resolution was rejected by a vote 
of twelve (Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Slovenia, United Kingdom, United States) to 
three (Russia, China, and Namibia), suggesting substantial support for 
the pro-intervention position.356 The legal debate continued before the 
International Court of Justice, where the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via filed applications against the United States and nine other NATO 
member states for “breach of [their] obligation not to use force against 
another State.”357 Here again, the outcome was inconclusive, with the 
ICJ ruling unanimously in December 2004 that it lacked jurisdiction 
because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not been a party to the 
statute of the court at the time it instituted the proceedings.358 The ICJ 
thus avoided taking a position on this difficult issue. 
B. The Campaign for R2P and Redefining Sovereignty 
 The debate over the Kosovo intervention revealed the lack of an 
agreed-upon legal basis and criteria for humanitarian intervention. It 
also highlighted the political opposition to intervention among the 
Chinese and Russian governments in the Security Council and a sizable 
number of developing countries in the General Assembly. Faced with 
this dual legal and political challenge, proponents of humanitarian in-
tervention took a new route after 1999. They sought to establish a new 
doctrinal basis and criteria for humanitarian intervention by building 
from a series of soft-law instruments. 
                                                                                                                      
deserves greater deference than purely unilateral action’. This is persuasive: NATO’s in-
tervention in Serbia is an illustration of ‘regional or collective unilateralism’, not of purely 
‘state unilateralism’ . . . .”) (quoting Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comment, NATO’s Cam-
paign in Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 828, 833 (1999)) (footnote omitted). See generally 
Chesterman, supra note 328, 211–15. 
355 See Permament Rep. of Russ. Fed’n to the U.N., Letter dated 24 March 1999 from 
the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council U.N. Doc. S/1999/320 (Mar. 26, 1999) (rejected 
by U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 [hereinafter Security 
Council, 3989th Meeting]). 
356 See Security Council, 3989th Meeting, supra note 355, at 6. 
357 Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), Preliminary Objections, 2004 
I.C.J. 279, ¶ 22 (Dec. 15). 
358 Id. ¶ 129. 
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 The first and most influential call came from then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, in his September 1999 report to the General As-
sembly. State sovereignty, Annan argued, was being “redefined,” with 
“the State . . . now widely understood to be the servant of its people, 
not vice versa.”359 Against the backdrop of recent experiences in areas 
such as the Balkans, Sudan, Cambodia, and especially Rwanda, Annan 
declared his clear support for the “developing international norm in 
favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter,” 
the implementation of which, he acknowledged, remained difficult and 
controversial.360 Just as significantly, Annan continued, the NATO in-
tervention in Kosovo added a new element to the debate over humani-
tarian intervention: 
It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of what has been called 
humanitarian intervention: on one side, the question of the 
legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization with-
out a United Nations mandate; on the other, the universally 
recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and system-
atic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian con-
sequences. 
The inability of the international community in the case of 
Kosovo to reconcile these two equally compelling interests— 
universal legitimacy and effectiveness in defence of human 
rights—can only be viewed as a tragedy.361 
Noting both the dangers of inaction in the face of Security Council pa-
ralysis (as in Rwanda) and the setting of “dangerous precedents” for 
future interventions without clear criteria or Council authorization (as 
in Kosovo), Annan called on the international community to “think 
anew,” to find “common ground” on intervention within the Council, 
and to broaden the definition of “intervention” to include preventive 
action, post-conflict reconstruction, and military action.362 
 Annan’s call was supported by the government of the United 
Kingdom, which, in late 1999, introduced in the Security Council a 
draft proposal for a set of criteria or guidelines for future humanitarian 
interventions, including: “the existence of an extreme humanitarian 
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emergency; the exhaustion of all peaceful remedies; an ‘objective de-
termination’ that force is the only means to avoid a humanitarian catas-
trophe; and conduct of a military operation so that it meets the re-
quirement of proportionality and is in conformity with international 
humanitarian law.”363 Furthermore, as Nicholas Wheeler points out in 
an excellent discussion, the British proposal did not include an explicit 
requirement for Security Council authorization: 
The whole rationale behind the UK initiative is to leave open 
the possibility that Western states might need to act outside of 
express SC [Security Council] authorisation in future cases. 
The goal of British diplomats was to secure agreement in the 
SC on the criteria that should govern the use of force in such 
cases, while leaving unresolved the question whether this re-
quired express SC authorisation. In the event that Western 
states intervened again without a UN mandate, the idea was 
that the intervening states could appeal to the previously 
agreed SC guidelines as a legitimating ground for action 
. . . .364 
 The British proposal was rejected in the Security Council, however, 
not only by China and Russia, but also by the United States.365 China 
opposed any discussion of criteria because it could provide a legitimiza-
tion of the principle of humanitarian intervention which it opposed.366 
Russia was prepared to back the British proposal only if it included an 
additional provision that any intervention to end a humanitarian 
emergency must have the express authorization of the Security Council 
(thereby retaining a Russian veto and forestalling the possible applica-
tion of the Kosovo precedent to a Russian region such as Chechnya).367 
In an early manifestation of concerns that would come to the fore dur-
ing the George W. Bush administration, the Clinton Administration in 
the United States opposed criteria that could constrain its freedom of 
action and create a legal obligation for the United States to intervene 
where the proposed criteria were met.368 
                                                                                                                      
363 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures, 
2 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 550, 564 (2001). 
364 Id. at 564–65. 
365 Id. at 552, 559, 564 (discussing the positions of the United States, China, and Rus-
sia). 
366 See id. at 555–56. 
367 See id. 
368 Id. at 564. 
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C. The Turn to Soft-Law Fora 
 With the path to the Security Council blocked, the advocates of 
stronger legal provisions on humanitarian intervention sought other 
forums in which to elaborate and advocate new legal norms, taking a 
soft-law approach as a pathway to revising hard law. Some states, such as 
Egypt, advocated dealing with the issue in the General Assembly, on the 
model of the 1950 “Uniting for Peace” resolution in calling for the 
General Assembly to take up issues of international peace and security 
when the Security Council is blocked.369 Advocates of humanitarian 
intervention did not initially pursue this option, however, both because 
of their attachment to the veto power of the permanent members (in 
the case of the British, French, and U.S. governments), and because of 
a concern that opposition from the Non-Aligned Movement would re-
sult in the rejection or watering down of any proposed provisions.370 
 In practice, therefore, proponents of new rules governing humani-
tarian intervention proceeded via a series of international commissions 
and UN reports, which formulated new legal principles for considera-
tion by the international community. To some extent, as Gareth Evans 
points out in an excellent intellectual history, this effort preceded the 
Kosovo intervention, dating back to a series of publications and reports 
over the course of the 1990s.371 In addition to the purported “right to 
intervene” championed by non-governmental organizations like Doc-
tors Without Borders, an important precursor to the responsibility to 
protect was the notion of “sovereignty as responsibility.” first put for-
ward in a series of reports and books by Francis Deng, who served as 
the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Dis-
placed Persons from 1992 to 2004, and by the writer Roberta Cohen, 
who argued as early as 1991 that “sovereignty carries with it a responsi-
bility on the part of governments to protect their citizens.”372 By and 
                                                                                                                      
 
369 Wheeler, supra note 363, at 565. 
370 See id. at 565–66. Indeed, as we shall demonstrate below, the proposed language on 
the responsibility to protect would be substantially watered down in negotiations at the 
2005 UN world summit and in the subsequent GA resolution. See infra notes 409–429 and 
accompanying text. 
371 See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity 
Crimes Once and for All 32–38 (2008). 
372 Id. at 32–37. Significantly, in 2007 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed 
Deng as his Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, placing a key figure in the 
development of R2P inside the Secretariat. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-
General Appoints Francis Deng of Sudan as Special Adviser for Prevention of Genocide, 
U.N. Press Release SG/A/1070 (May 29, 2007) (“On a related note, the Secretary-General 
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large, however, these notions remained at the margins of international 
law, and were generally not invoked in the resolutions adopted by the 
UN Security Council or other international organizations. 
 The most important step in this effort, by all accounts, was the cre-
ation, at the initiative of the Canadian government and its Foreign Min-
ister Lloyd Axworthy, of an International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”), designed “to wrestle with the whole 
range of questions—legal, moral, operational, and political—rolled up 
in this debate, to consult with the widest possible range of opinion 
around the world, and to bring back a report that would help the Sec-
retary-General and everyone else find some new common ground.”373 
The Commission was co-chaired by former Australian foreign minister 
Gareth Evans and Algerian diplomat Mohamad Sahnoun and com-
prised a diverse group of diplomats and scholars from both the North 
and South, who crucially were serving in their personal capacities ra-
ther than representing their respective governments. The Commission 
first met in September 2000, and delivered its report, “The Responsibil-
ity to Protect,” just over a year later, in December 2001.374 
 As the report makes clear, the Commission sought to reframe the 
issue, moving away from the language of humanitarian intervention 
and the purported “right” of states to intervene, and toward the dual 
concepts of “sovereignty as responsibility,”375 and of a “responsibility to 
protect” individuals at grave risk.376 This shift, the committee believed, 
would address some of the suspicions of states in the South, who feared 
that humanitarian intervention could provide political and legal license 
for powerful states to intervene in the sovereign affairs of smaller and 
weaker countries. The primary responsibility to protect, according to 
                                                                                                                      
is also exploring ways to strengthen United Nations efforts on the responsibility to protect, 
which may include the appointment of a separate adviser.”). 
373 ICISS, supra note 337, at vii. 
374 See id. 
375 Id. ¶¶ 2.14–.15. 
376 See, e.g., Stahn, supra note 332, at 102. 
The commission proposed dealing with this problem [the notion of humani-
tarian intervention as an assault on state sovereignty] . . . by conceiving of so-
vereignty as responsibility rather than control. The commission thus used a 
rhetorical trick: it flipped the coin, shifting the emphasis from a politically 
and legally undesirable right to intervene for humanitarian purposes to the 
less confrontational idea of a responsibility to protect. 
Id. 
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the report, applied in the first instance to states themselves,377 with the 
international community having a secondary or “residual responsibil-
ity” to intervene where a state is unwilling or unable to protect its own 
citizens.378 The “guiding principle” of a responsibility to protect, the 
Commission stated, was 
grounded in a miscellany of legal foundations (human rights 
treaty provisions, the Genocide Convention, Geneva Conven-
tions, International Criminal Court Statute and the like), 
growing state practice—and the Security Council’s own prac-
tice. If such a reliance continues in the future, it may eventu-
ally be that a new rule of customary international law to this 
effect comes to be recognized, but . . . it would be quite pre-
mature to make any claim about the existence now of such a 
rule.379 
In other words, the Commission was suggesting that the responsibility 
to protect was at best an emerging soft-law norm, coexisting alongside 
the hard-law protections of state sovereignty in existing treaty and cus-
tomary international law. 
 In addition to reframing the debate from a right to intervene and 
toward a responsibility to protect, the Commission sought to enlarge the 
concept of intervention, often strictly framed in terms of military inter-
vention to address current or impending humanitarian crises. Instead, 
the report spoke of a three-fold response to such crises: (1) a responsi-
bility to prevent crises through building domestic capacity, addressing 
domestic conflicts, and promoting the rule of law; (2) a responsibility to 
react though diplomatic, economic, as well as military means where cri-
ses did arise; and (3) a responsibility to rebuild through post-conflict re-
construction.380 Furthermore, the committee made clear, the emphasis 
                                                                                                                      
377 See ICISS, supra note 337, ¶ 2.30 (“The Commission believes that responsibility to 
protect resides first and foremost with the state whose people are directly affected. This 
fact reflects not only international law and the modern state system, but also the practical 
realities of who is best placed to make a positive difference.”). 
378 The Commission identified three conditions under which this residual responsibil-
ity of the international community would be activated: “when a particular state is clearly 
either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect”; “when a particular state 
. . . is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities”; and “where people living outside 
a particular state are directly threatened by actions taking place there.” Id. ¶ 2.31; see 
Stahn, supra note 332, at 104. 
379 ICISS, supra note 337, ¶ 6.17. 
380 Id. ¶¶ 2.29, 3.1–5.31. 
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should be placed on preventive action.381 By thus expanding the reper-
toire of international actions, the Commission hoped both to address 
humanitarian disasters more effectively as well as to weaken opposition 
among states that associated humanitarian intervention with military 
action by powerful states. 
 With respect to military intervention—the most controversial as-
pect of R2P, and the one creating the most obvious conflicts with state 
sovereignty—the Commission formulated a set of six criteria, under 
three headings: (1) a “just cause threshold,” (2) four “precautionary 
principles,” and (3) a “right authority” principle. The first heading, “just 
cause,” raised the crucial question of what kinds of humanitarian crises 
or disasters might justify or trigger the “exceptional and extraordinary 
measure” of military response from the international community. The 
Committee began by acknowledging the existing, hard-law principle of 
non-intervention: 
The starting point, here as elsewhere, should be the principle 
of non-intervention. This is the norm from which any depar-
ture has to be justified. All members of the United Nations 
have an interest in maintaining an order of sovereign, self-
reliant, responsible, yet interdependent states. In most situa-
tions, this interest is best served if all states, large and small, 
abstain from intervening or interfering in the domestic affairs 
of other states. Most internal political or civil disagreements, 
even conflicts, within states do not require coercive interven-
tion by external powers. The non-interference rule not only 
protects states and governments: it also protects peoples and 
cultures, enabling societies to maintain the religious, ethnic, 
and civilizational differences that they cherish.382 
 Given this starting point, the Commission set a high threshold for 
military intervention, ruling out the use of force for what one might 
call ordinary human rights abuses,383 and contemplating military inter-
                                                                                                                      
 
381 Evans, supra note 371, at 43, 79–80; ICISS, supra note 337, at xi (“4(A) Prevention 
is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect.”). 
382 ICISS, supra note 337, ¶ 4.11. 
383 See id. ¶ 4.25. 
[T]he Commission has resisted any temptation to identify as a ground for 
military intervention human rights violations falling short of outright killing 
or ethnic cleansing, for example systematic racial discrimination, or the sys-
tematic imprisonment or other repression of political opponents. These may 
be eminently appropriate cases for considering the application of political, 
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vention only in “cases of violence which so genuinely ‘shock the con-
science of mankind,’ or which present such a clear and present danger 
to international security, that they require coercive military interven-
tion.”384 More concretely, the Commission foresaw the use of military 
intervention only under two extreme sets of circumstances: (a) large-
scale loss of life or (b) large-scale ethnic cleansing.385 In doing so, the 
Commission opted for a relatively narrow, circumscribed scope for mili-
tary intervention, triggered only by extreme cases. As we shall see, how-
ever, the international community would later opt to circumscribe R2P 
still further to a specific set of international crimes.386 
 Assuming that the just cause threshold was met, the Commission 
then laid down four “precautionary principles” which would guide the 
intervention and the choice of means: (1) “right intention,” which 
must be “to halt or avert human suffering”; (2) “last resort,” such that 
military intervention is justified only when “every non-military option,” 
including political, economic, and military sanctions, has been ex-
plored; (3) proportional means, which should be the “minimum neces-
sary to secure the defined human protection objective”; and (4) “rea-
sonable prospects” of success in halting or averting human suffering, 
“with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the conse-
quences of inaction.”387 
 Finally, and controversially, the Commission considered the ques-
tion of “right authority,” namely which bodies should be empowered to 
authorize military intervention for humanitarian purposes.388 The 
Commission’s starting point was the claim that the Security Council 
enjoys the “primary,” but “not the sole or exclusive responsibility for 
                                                                                                                      
economic or military sanctions, but they do not in the Commission’s view jus-
tify military action for human protection purposes. 
Id. 
384 Id. ¶ 4.13. 
385 Id. ¶ 4.19. 
386 In the Commission’s view, these criteria were not limited to state-sponsored crimes, 
but also included “situations of state collapse and the resultant exposure of the population 
to mass starvation and/or civil war,” as well as “overwhelming natural or environmental 
catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for 
assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened.” Id. ¶ 4.20. These latter 
situations were excluded from subsequent formulations of the responsibility to protect, 
with implications for situations such as the 2006 cyclone in Myanmar, which might have 
been covered by the ICISS formulation but not by the narrower formulation of the UN 
GA. See infra notes 409–429 and accompanying text. 
387 ICISS, supra note 337, at xii & ¶¶ 4.32–.43. 
388 See id. at xii–xiii. 
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peace and security matters.”389 The Commission then noted that the 
Council had “too often . . . fallen short of its responsibilities, or failed to 
live up to expectations.”390 Accordingly, the Commission not only pro-
posed that the Council should be the “first port of call” in seeking to 
approve any military intervention.391 It also proposed that the Council 
adopt a “code of conduct” providing that “a permanent member, in 
matters where its vital national interests were not claimed to be in-
volved, would not use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would 
otherwise be a majority resolution.”392 Where the Council failed to dis-
charge its responsibility, the Commission went further. It considered 
the possibility of seeking support for military action in the GA, acting 
under the Uniting for Peace procedure,393 or alternatively of interven-
tion by regional organizations.394 The ICISS report was therefore sig-
nificant not only in putting forth a new norm of a responsibility to pro-
tect, together with criteria for its use, but also in suggesting that this 
new norm might be implemented by other bodies if and when the Se-
curity Council was paralyzed by a possible veto.395 
 The articulation of a responsibility to protect coincided with the 
preparation for the United Nations’ 60th anniversary summit in Sep-
tember 2005, at which Secretary-General Annan hoped to secure inter-
national support for a fundamental reform of UN institutions and poli-
cies.396 As a first step in this campaign, Annan created another interna-
tional committee, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
                                                                                                                      
389 Id. ¶ 6.7. 
390 Id. ¶ 6.23. 
391 Id. ¶ 6.28. 
392 Id. ¶ 6.21. 
393 ICISS, supra note 337, ¶¶ 6.29–.30. Recourse to the GA, the Commission noted, was 
limited in various ways, including the requirement of a two-thirds majority under the Unit-
ing for Peace procedure, and the fact that the GA “lacks the power to direct that action be 
taken.” Id. 
394 Id. ¶¶ 6.31–.35. “In strict terms,” the Commission noted, “the letter of the Charter 
requires action by regional organizations always to be subject to prior authorization from 
the Security Council,” although previous instances of post-hoc authorization in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone could leave “certain leeway for future action.” Id. ¶ 6.35. The Committee also 
distinguished instances in which regional organizations intervened in the affairs of mem-
ber states (as anticipated in the constituent instruments of the African Union and the Or-
ganization of American States), and the more difficult question of a regional organization 
intervening in the affairs of a neighboring nonmember state (as NATO did in Kosovo). Id. 
¶¶ 6.33–.34. In contrast to these possibilities, the Commission found little or no support 
for intervention by individual states or ad hoc coalitions, of the kind that the United States 
would later assemble for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. See id. ¶ 6.36. 
395 See id. ¶¶ 6.28–.40. 
396 See In Larger Freedom, supra note 339, ¶¶ 1–5. 
2011] Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security 1225 
Change (“HLP”).397 The panel of fifteen experts from the North and 
South, chaired by former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and 
former U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, had a wide 
mandate to identify the threats and challenges of the 21st century and 
make recommendations for UN reforms across a wide range of areas.398 
As part of this mandate, the HLP explicitly considered the issue of hu-
manitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, likely influ-
enced by the presence on the panel of Gareth Evans, who had co-
chaired the ICISS.399 Although the R2P concept had been enunciated 
just three years earlier by the ICISS, and had yet to be endorsed by ei-
ther the Security Council or the General Assembly, the final report of 
the High-Level Panel, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 
spoke of the responsibility to protect as an “emerging norm” of inter-
national law.400 The report maintained that: 
[T]here is a growing acceptance that while sovereign Govern-
ments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citi-
zens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwill-
ing to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider 
international community—with it spanning a continuum in-
volving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and re-
building shattered societies.401 
 The HLP was ambitious in its depiction of R2P as an “emerging 
norm,” given the recent origins of this concept and the absence of any 
reference to the doctrine in any high-level UN document or legal pro-
ceeding. In support of the norm’s development, the HLP recom-
mended that “the Council should adopt and systematically address a set 
of agreed guidelines, going directly not to whether force can legally be 
used but whether, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it 
should be.”402 The HLP then proposed five guidelines, drawn from but 
not identical to those in the ICISS report, including: (1) seriousness of 
threat, (2) proper purpose, (3) last resort, (4) proportional means, and 
(5) balance of consequences.403 These guidelines, the panel suggested, 
would “not produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictabil-
                                                                                                                      
397 See id. ¶ 4; Evans, supra note 371, at 5. 
398 See Evans, supra note 371, at 5. 
399 See id. at xiii, 5. 
400 High-Level Panel Report, supra note 338, ¶¶ 201–203. 
401 Id. ¶ 201. 
402 Id. ¶ 205. 
403 Id. ¶ 207. 
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ity,” but they would “maximize the possibility of achieving Security 
Council consensus around when it is appropriate or not to use coercive 
action, including armed force,” and would reciprocally “minimize the 
possibility of individual Member States bypassing the Security Coun-
cil.”404 Nevertheless, the panel, with a diverse membership including 
Russian and Chinese representatives, “broke with ICISS by omitting any 
discussion of what should happen if the Security Council was unable or 
unwilling to act.”405 The result was a significant endorsement of R2P, 
but one that failed to address one of the central issues arising out of the 
Kosovo intervention. It was therefore less radical in its implications, and 
more acceptable to champions of state sovereignty such as Russia and 
China. 
 The language of the HLP report was, in turn, largely incorporated 
into the Secretary-General’s March 2005 report, In Larger Freedom, 
which served as an informal agenda for the forthcoming 60th anniver-
sary summit of the UN.406 In the report, Annan repeated his forceful 
1999 message about sovereignty and responsibility,407 and proceeded to 
endorse the R2P provisions of the HLP report: 
While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, 
I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that we must embrace 
the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. 
This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual 
                                                                                                                      
404 Id. ¶ 206. 
405 Nicholas J. Wheeler, A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After 
the 2005 World Summit, 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 95, 96 (2005). Indeed, one author sug-
gests, the panel’s agreement on the principle of the responsibility to protect was 
crucially dependent upon the High-level Panel’s explicit statement that the 
use of force would have to be authorized by the Council under its Chapter VII 
provisions. It was this criterion that the United Kingdom had refused to ac-
cept in negotiations over criteria in the Council, believing that such a con-
straint would bind it and its allies in future cases where consideration was be-
ing given to using force without express Council authorization, as had hap-
pened over Kosovo. 
Id. at 99. 
406 See In Larger Freedom, supra note 339, ¶¶ 4, 135. 
407 Id. ¶ 132. 
We must also move towards embracing and acting on the “responsibility to 
protect” potential or actual victims of massive atrocities. The time has come 
for Governments to be held to account, both to their citizens and to each 
other, for respect of the dignity of the individual, to which they too often pay 
only lip service. 
Id. 
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State, whose primary raison d’être and duty is to protect its 
population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling 
to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the in-
ternational community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other methods to help protect the human rights and well-
being of civilian populations. When such methods appear in-
sufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to 
take action under the Charter of the United Nations, includ-
ing enforcement action, if so required.408 
D. Global Consensus? The 2005 World Summit Endorses R2P 
 Having received the endorsement of the High-Level Panel and the 
Secretary-General’s pre-summit report, the responsibility to protect 
doctrine was finally taken up by the UN member states in advance of 
the UN’s 60th anniversary summit in September 2005. The 2005 sum-
mit in general was notable for the extraordinary ambition of its pre-
paratory documents, which sought fundamental UN reform across a 
range of security, development, and human rights issues and institu-
tions, and for the paucity of its final results, which failed to agree on 
core issues such as the reform of the Security Council or the Secre-
tariat.409 In the context of that larger failure, the consensus agreement 
on the responsibility to protect is often depicted as one of the few tan-
gible achievements of the summit.410 Yet a closer examination reveals 
that the R2P issue, like the rest of the issues raised at the summit, was 
the subject of intense negotiation and compromise among the UN’s 
member governments in the preceding weeks and months. Indeed, 
while the proposed declaration was to be a non-binding, soft-law docu-
ment, negotiations on this issue involved hard bargaining in light of 
member states’ understanding of the link between the R2P doctrine 
and hard law, and in particular possible future Chapter VII-authorized 
humanitarian interventions or, in their absence, alleged justifications of 
intervention under customary international law. This prospect led to 
considerable dissention among the member states. 
 In the negotiations leading up to and at the 2005 world summit, 
the Secretary-General and a number of liberal democratic member 
states, and in particular the European Union members and Canada, 
                                                                                                                      
408 Id. ¶ 135. 
409 See Wheeler, supra note 405, at 98–102. 
410 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 371, at 47. 
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pressed the other members for a specific declaration on the responsi-
bility to protect.411 In doing so, however, they encountered significant 
resistance from several quarters. Russia and China, although lacking 
veto power in the General Assembly, remained opposed to any lan-
guage that could substantially weaken the bedrock principle of state 
sovereignty and/or bypass the Security Council and the security of a P–
5 veto.412 Just as significantly in the context of the General Assembly, 
the majority of states in the Non-Aligned Movement strongly opposed 
any language that would loosen existing restraints on the use of force— 
not least because the United States and Great Britain had recently cited 
humanitarian justifications for their 2003 invasion of Iraq.413 The Unit-
ed States, now represented by the administration of President George 
W. Bush and his controversial UN Ambassador John Bolton, was widely 
seen as a spoiler at the world summit, proposing a last-minute series of 
nearly 700 amendments to the proposed summit declaration.414 With 
respect to R2P, the Bush Administration supported the concept of a 
responsibility to protect, but vigorously opposed any provisions that 
would limit U.S. freedom of action in the use of force, including any 
R2P language that might legally obligate the United States to intervene 
against its will.415 
                                                                                                                      
 
411 Wheeler, supra note 405, at 101. 
412 Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, 84 
Int’l Aff. 615, 625 (2008). 
413 The collective statement of the NAM countries in 2000 was: 
We also want to reiterate our firm condemnation of all unilateral military ac-
tions without proper authorisation [sic] from the United Nations Security 
Council. . . . We reject the so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, 
which has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of in-
ternational law. 
Wheeler, supra note 363, at 563 n.50 (quoting the Foreign Ministers of the Movement of 
Non-Aligned Countries) (alterations in original). Members of the African Union, by con-
trast, had embraced in its 2002 Constitutive Act “the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” Evans, supra note 371, at 274 
n.21. Nevertheless, African countries generally remained skeptical of R2P at the UN level 
in the negotiations, and in particular of any effort to bypass Security Council authoriza-
tion. Wheeler, supra note 363, at 563 n.50. 
414 Evans, supra note 371, at 47. 
415 See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 405, at 101 (citing Ambassador Bolton & Permanent 
Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter from Ambassador John Bolton, Permanent Represen-
tative of the United States of America to the UN, to the United Nations (Aug. 30, 2005)). 
In his August 30, 2005 letter to the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton ac-
knowledged: 
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 Given this array of state preferences, and the formidable opposi-
tion to humanitarian intervention among both great powers and non-
aligned states, it is remarkable that the 2005 world summit, having 
deadlocked on nearly all other matters of importance, was able to 
adopt a provision explicitly endorsing the “responsibility to protect” 
doctrine: 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity 
 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the preven-
tion of such crimes, including their incitement, through ap-
propriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility 
and will act in accordance with it. The international commu-
nity should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exer-
cise this responsibility and support the United Nations in es-
tablishing an early warning capability. 
 139. The international community, through the United Na-
tions, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take col-
lective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with re-
levant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the 
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of 
the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
                                                                                                                      
[T]he international community has a responsibility to act when the host state 
allows such atrocities. But the responsibility of the other countries in the in-
ternational community is not of the same character as the responsibility of 
the host. . . . We do not accept that either the United Nations as a whole, or 
the Security Council, or individual states, have an obligation to intervene un-
der international law. 
Id; see also Evans, supra note 371, at 47. 
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implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter 
and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.416 
 The General Assembly’s explicit embrace of a responsibility to pro-
tect is indeed a significant step that reflects the advocacy of governments 
such as those of Great Britain and Canada, the embrace of “limited-
sovereignty principles” by a growing number of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America, and the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan and other advocates from international and nongovernmental 
organizations.417 Nevertheless, the specific language of the world sum-
mit declaration differs in important ways from the ICISS and other pre-
vious articulations of R2P, and reflects the interests of the various mem-
ber states and the compromises necessary to reach consensus.418 
 Four observations are in order. 
 First, and most obviously, the ICISS, HLP, and the Secretary-
General’s articulations of the responsibility to protect all featured ex-
plicit criteria or guidelines for the Security Council in authorizing the 
use of force. Nevertheless, explicit criteria were opposed by a diverse 
group of countries, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, and 
the United States, and no such criteria were adopted in the final doc-
ument.419 The final document does anticipate the possibility of Chapter 
VII action where “peaceful means [are] inadequate,” but only “on a 
case-by-case basis” where “national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.”420 Hence, Annan’s call for a clear set of 
                                                                                                                      
416 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 326, ¶¶ 138–139. 
417 Evans, supra note 371, at 50. The linkages between R2P and other issues have also 
been emphasized, for example in attributing China’s willingness to sign on to a watering 
down of provisions on the proposed Human Rights Council, which China opposed. See 
Wheeler, supra note 405, at 101–02. 
418 For critical analyses of these documents, emphasizing the changes and omissions of 
the world summit outcome document, see Wheeler, supra note 405, at 96–105; and Stahn, 
supra note 332, at 102–10. See also Evans, supra note 371, at 47–50, which provides a 
somewhat more optimistic interpretation of the summit language. 
419 See Wheeler, supra note 405, at 101–02. 
420 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 326, ¶ 139. For a good discussion, see 
Bellamy, supra note 412, at 625–30; and Wheeler, supra note 405, at 102. See also Evans, 
supra note 371, at 48, for a concession by an author who generally defends the world sum-
mit language against critics that the absence of explicit criteria is a “disappointing omis-
sion.” 
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guidelines, to lend both urgency and consistency to the Security Coun-
cil’s decisions on the use of force, remained to be answered after the 
world summit.421 
 Second, both the ICISS and earlier British efforts within the Secu-
rity Council following the Kosovo intervention had sought to leave 
open the possibility of action by the GA, or regional organizations or 
individual states, in the event of deadlock in the Security Council. This 
option had been a casualty of negotiations in the High-Level Panel, 
however, and enjoyed scant support among the bulk of the UN mem-
bership, particularly after the unauthorized US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003.422 The world summit document is thus silent on this point, lead-
ing UN scholar Thomas Weiss to refer to the summit declaration as an 
“R2P lite.”423 Whether and how states or regional organizations may 
proceed in the event of Security Council paralysis remains as question-
able today as it was during the Kosovo intervention a decade ago. 
 Third, as Nicholas Wheeler points out, “governments which are 
reluctant about humanitarian intervention are increasingly persuaded 
that the language of the responsibility to protect can be used to con-
strain rather than enable interventions.”424 In Wheeler’s view, states 
concerned with bolstering national sovereignty sought to influence the 
specific formulation of R2P, emphasizing the primary responsibility of 
national governments and stripping away detail and clarity from the 
text on the “residual” responsibility of the international community. By 
contrast with previous versions of R2P, the world summit outcome doc-
ument places particular stress on the responsibilities of states to protect 
their own populations, and declares that the member states “accept 
that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.”425 In addition, 
however, the world summit document adds new language (not present 
in earlier manifestations) that “collective action” should only be taken 
where national governments are “manifestly failing” to protect their 
own populations from a list of four international crimes. The meaning 
                                                                                                                      
421 See In Larger Freedom, supra note 339, ¶ 135. 
422 Bellamy, supra note 412, at 625–26; id. at 616 n.11 (noting that the first Security 
Council discussion of the responsibility to protect, in 2002, elicited strong views from Chi-
na and Russia regarding the importance of a Security Council mandate for any proposed 
intervention). 
423 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention 117 (2007). But see Bellamy, supra 
note 412, at 618, 625–30 (arguing that the ICISS criteria, while innovative, were and are 
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424 Wheeler, supra note 405, at 102; see also Bellamy, supra note 412, at 625. 
425 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 326, ¶ 138. 
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of manifest failure is left unspecified in the text, but, as Alex Bellamy 
has demonstrated, defenders of national sovereignty and opponents of 
intervention have already pointed to the primary responsibility of 
home governments and the “manifest failure” provision to argue 
against international intervention.426 Indeed, the UN Secretary-
General’s 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 
maintains that the doctrine “does not alter; indeed it reinforces, the 
legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the use of force ex-
cept in conformity with the Charter.”427 
 Fourth and finally, in terms of our analysis of hard and soft law, the 
world summit outcome document, like the aforementioned reports 
that developed R2P, is a soft-law declaration. It is not directly binding 
on UN member states and clearly is not enjoying the status of either 
treaty or customary international law.428 States engaged in hard bar-
gaining on the language of R2P because of its implication for future 
legally binding Security Council decisions to intervene in particular 
countries. They endorsed the concept in the abstract but stripped away 
the criteria that might have guided its application in practice. The UN 
member states did not use soft law to elaborate existing hard-law provi-
sions, but rather opted to paper over their differences with a vague and 
underspecified definition of the responsibility to protect, omitting the 
explicit criteria that had been a feature of the previous three docu-
ments.429 As a result, the world summit language provides little or no 
guidance as to when and how the Security Council may and should in-
tervene for humanitarian purposes, or what may and should be done in 
the event of paralysis in the Security Council. 
                                                                                                                      
426 Bellamy, supra note 412, at 623–25. 
427 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 ( Jan. 12, 2009). 
428 Stahn, supra note 332, at 101 (“None of the four main documents in which respon-
sibility to protect has been treated in depth can be regarded as generating binding inter-
national law under the classic sources of international law set forth in Article 38 of the 
Statue of the International Court of Justice . . . .”). 
429 See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 405, at 96. 
The High-level Panel shared the Canadian sponsored Commission’s enthusi-
asm for reaching an agreement on the criteria that should govern the use of 
force, and this idea was taken up by Annan in his major report In Larger Free-
dom, which sets out a detailed blueprint for UN reform. However, this part of 
the reform package was a casualty of the negotiations in New York which took 
place in the run-up to the world summit. 
Id. 
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E. Implementing R2P Since 2005: Backpedaling? 
 The record of normative development and implementation of the 
R2P doctrine has been at best mixed since the 2005 world summit. The 
“good news,” Gareth Evans writes, includes an embrace of the concept 
by the new Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who fully endorsed R2P 
and proposed a special advisor to guide him on the implementation of 
the concept.430 In addition, the norm of the responsibility to protect 
has become part of the “working language” of international organiza-
tions, NGOs, and governments in response to crises such as the ongo-
ing massacres in Darfur and the election-related violence in Kenya in 
2007 and 2008.431 Perhaps most significantly, Evans notes, R2P has se-
cured at least a “toehold” within the Security Council.432 For example, 
in Security Council Resolution 1674, a thematic resolution on the pro-
tection of civilians in armed conflict, the Security Council reaffirmed 
the summit language on R2P.433 The inclusion of the R2P concept in a 
hard-law Security Council Resolution is potentially significant. The ref-
erence to R2P in Resolution 1674, however, is brief, does not elaborate 
on the concept or its application, and it is not invoked in the context of 
any specific authorization for a UN-sanctioned humanitarian interven-
tion.434 Perhaps more importantly, the Security Council did not choose 
to invoke the responsibility to protect doctrine in other resolutions re-
lating to the ongoing humanitarian disaster in Darfur, or to the hu-
manitarian effects of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in May 2006.435 
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 Nor is the weakness in implementation limited to the Security 
Council. Although the states agreed unanimously to endorse R2P at the 
2005 world summit, a growing number of states have evidenced appar-
ent “buyer’s remorse” in subsequent debates.436 In early 2008, for ex-
ample, the General Assembly met to consider Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon’s appointment of Edward Luck as “Special Advisor on the Re-
sponsibility to Protect”: 
The prevailing mood in at least some quarters was captured 
. . . by the way in which, with evidently perfectly straight faces, 
Latin American, Arab, and African delegates to the UN’s 
budget committee took to the floor to say, variously, that “the 
World Summit rejected R2P in 2005,” “the concept of the re-
sponsibility to protect has not been adopted by the General 
Assembly,” and “the responsibility to protect itself . . . was not 
accepted or approved as a principle by the General Assem-
bly”. . . . For whatever reason . . . there is a recurring willing-
ness by a number of states to deflate or undermine the new 
norm before it is fully consolidated and operational. There has 
been a falling away of overt commitment to the norm in sub-
Saharan Africa . . . and some increased skepticism in the Arab-
Islamic and Latin American worlds. And in Asia there has nev-
er been much enthusiasm . . . .437 
 Reflecting this normative backpedaling by some states, as well as 
the absence of forceful action by the Security Council in Darfur, a grow-
ing number of activists and practitioners have begun to question the 
significance and the implementation of the R2P doctrine.438 As U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted in an interview with the New 
York Times: 
I think we thought the Responsibility to Protect meant some-
thing. I remember when the responsibility-to-protect language 
came up at the 2006 [sic] United Nations General Assembly, 
and I remember thinking at the time: If this turns out to be 
nothing but words, the Security Council is going to have a real 
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black eye, and in the Darfur case it has turned out to be noth-
ing but words. I think it has been an enormous embarrassment 
for the Security Council and for multilateral diplomacy.439 
In Rice and other critics’ views, the official world summit declaration 
remains a soft-law provision, vague and open to multiple interpreta-
tions, and offers little concrete guidance regarding the legal justifica-
tion or the specific criteria for humanitarian intervention.440 The lan-
guage of R2P has also failed to overcome the principled objections to 
such intervention among states such as Russia and China, which con-
tinue to block more forceful action in crises such as the one in Darfur. 
 None of this analysis suggests that the responsibility to protect is 
dead, or that it will not, in time, be more fully elaborated and serve as a 
guide to action in the Security Council and elsewhere. Indeed, much of 
the literature on R2P over the past several years has been designed to 
“move the agenda forward” by clarifying, institutionalizing, and provid-
ing political will to implement the concept in practice for purposes of 
its progressive development.441 Perhaps the clearest manifestation of 
this has been in UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which author-
ized the use of all necessary means—including a NATO-enforced no-fly 
zone—to protect civilians from the military forces of Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi.442 This intervention, and other recent actions in 
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Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere, have been hailed as signs of a “new poli-
tics of protection,” in which civilian protection has become a reflexive 
priority of the international community, whose members have demon-
strated a clear willingness to invoke R2P and authorize the use of force 
through the Security Council, and against the will of the target state.443 
The international community’s response to events in Libya has indeed 
been remarkable, although a careful reading suggests that Libyan case 
has been unusual in terms of the clarity and ferocity of the slaughter by 
Gaddafi’s forces as well as the highly unusual calls for intervention by 
regional organizations such as the (normally sovereignty-conscious) 
Arab League.444 It is also striking that Resolution 1973 was adopted with 
five abstentions, all from large countries (China, Russia, Brazil, Ger-
many, and India), and that the invocation to R2P was limited to a pre-
ambular reference to Libya’s primary responsibility to protect its own 
people.445 Finally, NATO’s implementation of the Security Council 
mandate has proven controversial, with Russia, China, and South Af-
rica, among others, accusing the alliance of overstepping the bounds of 
its mandate in the months-long campaign of aerial bombardment of 
the Libyan government and military.446 In any event, the precedent of 
the Libyan case has not been followed, at this writing, by any similar 
intervention, or even any clear Security Council denunciation of Syria 
for similar actions with respect to its own civilians, despite clear and re-
peated criticism from the UN Secretariat, the EU, and others.447 All of 
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these considerations suggest caution in our interpretation of the ro-
bustness of the R2P norm, whose political fate is likely to be influenced 
by the ultimate outcome of the intervention in Libya. 
 Regardless of how we interpret the Libyan case, the foregoing ac-
count of the legal documents and developments dispels any image of a 
harmonious, complementary relationship between the hard-law provi-
sions of the UN Charter and the new soft-law provisions on the respon-
sibility to protect found in international commission and UN reports 
and in the 2005 world summit outcome document. The relationship 
among these provisions, rather, is antagonistic, in the dual sense refer-
enced above: from a legal perspective, in the antagonism or tension 
between the limited-sovereignty language of the responsibility to pro-
tect and the more absolute-sovereignty language of the Charter; and, 
from a political perspective, in the antagonism among states, some of 
which have sought to undermine absolute sovereignty through R2P 
while others have sought—with some apparent success—to mold the 
doctrine to bolster (or at least not undermine) state sovereignty. 
F. Hard and Soft Law Interaction in the R2P Case 
 Our reading of the R2P case once again supports our hypotheses 
about the interactions of hard and soft law in international law’s devel-
opment. In this case, and consistent with Hypothesis 1, the great pow-
ers of the UN Security Council were broadly in agreement regarding 
the legal protection of state sovereignty from the end of World War II 
through the end of the Cold War; during this period we do not see an 
antagonistic relationship between hard- and soft-law provisions on the 
questions of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.448 With the 
end of the Cold War, however, and in particular following NATO’s 
precedent-setting Kosovo intervention in 1999, the permanent mem-
bers of the UN Security Council were divided. Britain, France, and 
(with some reservations) the United States, supported by a coalition of 
liberal democratic states, sought a new legal norm of humanitarian in-
tervention, while Russia and China, supported by most of the members 
of the Non-Aligned Movement, sought to protect the existing hard-law 
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principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention.449 These states’ 
positions reflected the distributive implications at stake with a change 
in international law. Unable to secure the necessary consensus for new 
hard-law provisions, and consistent with Hypothesis 4, the advocates of 
humanitarian intervention turned to a series of soft-law fora, namely 
the series of international commissions that developed the R2P con-
cept, as well as the 2005 world summit outcome document.450 
 Proponents of the responsibility to protect have often denied that 
this new soft-law norm challenges the hard-law provisions of the UN 
Charter, arguing that soft law complements hard law by clarifying and 
progressively developing the content and the limits of sovereignty in 
the Charter.451 We find such arguments unpersuasive. Based on the his-
torical evidence surveyed, it is clear that the advocates of humanitarian 
intervention were indeed proposing a new legal norm, which at a min-
imum requires a dramatic reinterpretation of the long-standing, hard-
law principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. States and 
non-state actors deployed existing hard and new soft law as antagonists, 
with the results predicted in Hypothesis 2. More concretely, we have 
seen a coalition of powerful and weaker states strategically using various 
soft-law fora, including international commissions and the UN General 
Assembly, to challenge existing hard law and its interpretation. This 
antagonistic interaction of hard and soft law has led to some softening 
of existing hard-law provisions on state sovereignty. The precise mean-
ing of the legal principle and the accompanying obligation of states not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of other states are now less certain. At 
the same time, the processes within those soft-law fora increasingly in-
volved hard bargaining when they reached the General Assembly, with 
sovereignty-conscious states fighting to water down the R2P doctrine at 
each stage in its development, and subsequently backpedaling on its 
substantive content as well as on the application of the doctrine in prac-
tice. The result—to the disappointment of R2P champions like Ev-
ans452—is the co-existence of a soft-law responsibility to protect norm 
and hard-law state sovereignty and nonintervention norms, with little 
clarity about how these norms might be reconciled or implemented in 
practice. In sum, hard and soft law did not work in this case as com-
plements to progressively develop and clarify international law. Actors, 
rather, strategically used them as antagonists, in reflection of the vary-
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ing distributive implications for states, resulting in confusion rather 
than clarification of the law of state sovereignty and humanitarian in-
tervention at the start of the 21st century. 
Conclusion 
 The two security cases examined here—the nuclear weapons case 
and the humanitarian intervention case—are different in many ways 
from the economic, “trade-and” cases that we have examined previ-
ously.453 The subject matter, the key coalitions of states, the legal in-
struments, and the political fora for these debates all differ starkly from 
the transatlantic disputes over genetically modified foods and cultural 
diversity. And yet, the fundamental dynamics of hard- and soft-law in-
teraction—the strategic use of these instruments as antagonists, the 
ubiquity of forum-shopping, the hardening of soft-law deliberations, 
and the muddying and softening of hard-law rules—are all present in 
the security cases as well as in the economic cases. The strategic use of 
hard and soft law, therefore, as well as the predictable results from such 
use, are not issue-specific, but are general features of international law 
and politics. 
                                                                                                                     
 In both of these cases, consistent with our hypotheses, the great 
powers of the post-war era sought to entrench strong, and even consti-
tutive, norms in binding, hard law, and in some cases in the quasi-
constitutional framework of the UN Charter. In both cases, in the 
course of subsequent decades, revisionist states attempted to counter 
existing hard-law rules with new hard-law provisions in treaties, or 
through the creation of new customary international law. In the first 
instance, mostly less developed, nonnuclear countries led the charge. 
In the second case, a coalition of large and politically liberal states took 
the initiative. In a setting of fundamental normative conflict, however, 
the revisionists’ efforts at hard law creation have generally been unsuc-
cessful. Revisionist states therefore settled for the establishment of new 
soft-law norms, at odds with existing hard-law provisions, with the aim 
of undermining or reorienting them. 
 The resulting antagonistic interaction of hard- and soft-law in-
struments has had impacts on the purported advantages of hard- and 
soft-law fora and regimes in these cases, again consistent with our hy-
potheses. Intergovernmental soft-law fora have become characterized 
by hard bargaining in light of the potential implications of new soft law 
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for existing hard law. The existing hard law, in parallel, has become less 
clear and determinate, and thus softer in its implications. In both cases 
the final result has not been a progressive development of more elabo-
rate international law, but rather a stalemate, in which various states 
and non-state actors engage in an ongoing struggle to shape the con-
tent and interpretation of international law in light of the distributive 
implications at stake. 
 Indeed, only one striking difference emerges from our security 
cases as compared with the economic or “trade-and” cases analyzed in 
our previous works and in other studies of forum-shopping and regime-
shifting. In those economic cases, distributive conflicts over the making 
and interpretation of international law take place among multiple dis-
tinct and overlapping international regimes, such as the World Trade 
Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Convention on 
Biodiversity. By contrast, much (though not all) of the struggle to de-
fine and interpret international law in the R2P case took place within 
the single regime of the UN system. In this case, the multiple decision-
making bodies within the UN system—including most notably the 
General Assembly, the Security Council, the ICJ, the Secretariat, and 
soft-law commissions—are characterized by different memberships and 
different decision rules which differentially empower the various par-
ties to the dispute, and which therefore provide ample incentive and 
opportunity to engage in strategic forum-shopping even within a single 
regime like the UN system. 
 Thus far in this Article, we have sought to analyze the antagonistic 
interaction of hard and soft law in both theory and practice, but we 
have refrained from offering a normative assessment of that interac-
tion. Such an assessment would (and should) depend both on one’s 
substantive position on the particular issue in question, as well as one’s 
degree of systemic concern about the optimal level of uniformity or 
fragmentation of international law in a pluralist world. In the nuclear 
weapons case, for example, one’s attitude toward the soft-law campaign 
to declare the threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal depends in large 
part on one’s substantive views about that issue. Similarly, the R2P cam-
paign is likely to be assessed quite differently by proponents of humani-
tarian intervention on the one hand and of state sovereignty on the 
other. In substantive terms, therefore, a single observer—say, one with 
views sympathetic to those of the U.S. government—might at one and 
the same time condemn the soft-law campaign against nuclear weapons 
as destabilizing the international security system, while defending the 
use of soft-law R2P language as “progressively developing” the law of 
the UN Charter in light of evolving human rights norms. 
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 Beyond one’s substantive preferences with respect to a given issue, 
however, lies a larger systemic question about the uniformity or frag-
mentation of international law. It has, as we have seen, become com-
monplace for legal scholars to lament the fragmentation of the interna-
tional legal order, and such scholars might well see the antagonistic use 
of hard and soft law as contributing to such fragmentation and confu-
sion. Indeed, we have suggested in this Article that the net effect of 
hard- and soft-law interaction in our two security cases, as in the eco-
nomic cases we have previously examined, has indeed been to muddy 
the waters and render international law less rather than more clear. By 
the same token, however, defenders of legal pluralism might well re-
spond that the proliferation of voices in the international legal debate 
has been normatively desirable in both the nuclear weapons and hu-
manitarian intervention debates, and may in the future—possibly after 
a prolonged period of stalemate—finally lead to the progressive devel-
opment of international law called for in the UN Charter. 
 Regardless of one’s position on the substantive issues at stake, or 
on the normative desirability of international legal pluralism, the an-
tagonistic interaction of hard and soft law is now a fact of life in both 
the economic and security spheres, and is likely to shape these and 
other legal and policy debates for many years to come. 
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